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CONTENT REGULATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT*
GEOFFREY

R. STONE**

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the most intriguing feature of contemporary first
amendment doctrine is the increasingly invoked distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions on expression. Although the distinction has its roots in decisions of the
1930's and 1940's, and began gradually to emerge as a central premise of the Court's analysis in the 1950's and 1960's, it was not
until the last decade that the distinction attained its present prominence.1 It is, indeed, the Burger Court's foremost contribution to
first amendment analysis, and it is, today, the most pervasively
employed doctrine in the jurisprudence of free expression.2
Content-neutral restrictions limit communication without regard
to the message conveyed. Laws that prohibit noisy speeches near a
* A version of this Article was presented on April 15, 1983, as the Cutler Lecture at the
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
** Professor of Law, University of Clhcago. B.S. 1968, Umversity of Pennsylvania; J.D.
1971, University of Chicago. I would like to thank Mary Becker, Gerhard Casper, David
Currie, Frank Easterbrook, William Marshall, Geoffrey Miller, Frederick Schauer, Lous
Seidman, and Cass Sunstein for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I
would also like to thank my research assistant, Robert Rasmussen.
1. This development is traced m Stephan, The FirstAmendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REv. 203, 214-31 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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hospital, ban billboards in residential communities, impose license
fees for parades and demonstrations, or forbid the distribution of
leaflets in public places are examples of content-neutral restrictions. Content-based restrictions, on the other hand, limit communication because of the message conveyed. Laws that prohibit seditious libel, ban the publication of confidential information, forbid
the hiring of teachers who advocate the violent overthrow of government, or outlaw the display of the swastika in certain neighborhoods illustrate this type of restriction. The Court employs two
quite distinct modes of analysis to assess the constitutionality of
content-based and content-neutral restrictions. This dichotomy
has come under attack in recent years.' In this Article, I will explore the merits and limitations of the content-based/content-neutral distinction.
I.

CONTENT-NEUTRAL ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court tests the constitutionality of content-neutral
restrictions with an essentially open-ended form of balancing. That
is, in each case the Court considers the extent to which the restriction limits communication, "the substantiality of the government
interests" served by the restriction, and "whether those interests
could be served by means that would be less intrusive on activity
protected by the First Amendment."4 The burden on government
to demonstrate the substantiality of its interests and the absence
of less restrictive alternatives varies from case to case, depending
upon the extent to which the restriction actually interferes with
the opportunities for effective communication. The greater the interference with effective communication, the greater the burden on
government to justify the restriction. 5
3. See, e.g., Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALn. L.
REv. 422, 472 n.116 (1980); Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revi-

sionist View, 68 GEo. L.J. 727 (1980); Redish, The Content Distinctionin First Amendment
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113 (1981); Stephan, supra note 1; Note, A Unitary Approach to
Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 35 STAN. L. REv. 121
(1982).

4. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 70 (1981).
5. Compare United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.

114 (1981); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981);
and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which the Court upheld content-neu-

tral restrictions, with Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); NAACP v.
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Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); and Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), in which the Court
invalidated such restrictions.
In Greenburgh,Heffron, and O'Brien, the Court considered the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions that did not appreciably limit the ability of individuals to communicate their views effectively to others. In Greenburgh, the Court upheld a federal statute
that prohibited the deposit of unstamped "mailable matter" in any letterbox, as applied to
civic associations that had engaged in the practice of placing unstamped notices in the letterboxes of private homes. At trial, the government presented evidence that the prohibited
practice was only marginally more effective than such permitted alternatives as paying postage, hanging notices on doorknobs, and placing notices under doors. Moreover, in sustaining
the restriction, the Court emphasized the difference between letterboxes and such traditional first amendment fora as public streets and parks, and found no historical "support for the
characterization of a letterbox as a public forum." 453 U.S. at 128. The Court thus sustained
the statute because it was reasonable and content-neutral. Id. at 131 n.7.
In Heffron, the Court upheld a Minnesota State Fair rule prohibiting the distribution of
any merchandise, including written materials, except from a licensed booth, as applied to a
religious organization that wished to distribute written material in a peripatetic manner at
the fair. Although characterizing the fair as a "limited public forum," the Court emphasized
that the challenged rule left open ample alternative channels of communication. Individuals
remained free to distribute literature outside the fairgrounds, to mingle with the crowd and
to propagate their views orally, and to acquire booths from which they could distribute literature on the fairgrounds itself. The Court thus concluded that the state's interest in avoiding congestion and maintaining orderly movement of fair patrons was "sufficient to satisfy
the requirement [that the restriction] serve a substantial state interest," and rejected the
religious organization's argument that the restriction was unnecessary because the state
could protect its interest by less restrictive means-such as penalizing actual disruption,
limiting the number of distributors, or putting more narrowly drawn restrictions on the location and movement of distributors. The Court found "quite improbable" the assertion
that such alternatives "would deal adequately with the problems." 452 U.S. at 654.
In O'Brien, the Court upheld a federal statute that prohibited any person from knowingly
destroying a draft card. The government prosecuted O'Brien for publicly burning his draft
card as a symbolic expression of protest against the draft and the Vietnam war. Although
O'Brien's act surely had dramatic appeal, the statute did not limit more conventional means
of voicing opposition to government policy. The restriction thus did not impair significantly
O'Brien's ability to communicate his message effectively to the public. Although the Court
stated that, to withstand constitutional attack, the statute must further a "substantial governmental interest" and must be no more intrusive on first amendment rights "than is essential to furtherance of that interest," 391 U.S. at 377, the Court actually applied a "no
gratuitous inhibition" approach, sustaining the statute because it rationally furthered a legitimate governmental interest and did not needlessly inhibit O'Brien's expression. See Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-CardBurning Case, 1968 Sup. CT.
Rxv. 1, 23-26; Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv.L. REV. 1482, 1488-89 (1975). For a dis-

cussion of the substantiality of the restriction in O'Brien, see L. TRMIE, AMERXCAN

CONSTrruTONAL LAW 686 (1978); Alfange, supra, at 27; Ely, supra, at 1489-90 & n.29; Redish, supra

note 3, at 147-49; Velvel, Draft Card Burning Cases, 16 U. KAN. L. REy. 149, 153 (1968).
In each of these cases, then, the challenged restriction did not significantly impair effective communication. In each case, the Court applied a highly deferential standard, sustaining the restriction with little, if any, scrutiny of the substantiality of the government's
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The Court's primary concern' in the content-neutral realm is

interest and without insisting that the government attempt to achieve its interest through
less restrictive means.
In Schad, Button, and Schneider, the Court considered the constitutionality of contentneutral restrictions that significantly impaired effective communication. In each case, the
Court employed a relatively stringent form of balancing. In Schad, the Court held that a
zonifig ordinance that prohibited all live entertainment in the borough was unconstitutional.
The Court emphasized that the ordinance constituted a "substantial restriction of protected
activity [and failed to] leave open adequate alternative channels of communication." 452
U.S. at 72, 76. Although the borough argued that the restriction was necessary to avoid the
problems associated with live entertainment-such as parking, trash, and police protection-the Court observed that the borough had failed to present evidence "that live entertainment poses problems of this nature more significant than those associated with various permitted" activities, and that the borough had failed to establish "that its interests
could not be met by restrictions that are less intrusive on protected forms of expression."
Id. at 73, 74.
In Button, the Court held that a Virginia statute unconstitutionally restricted the solicitation of legal business, as applied to the activities of the NAACP, which routinely solicited
plaintiffs for its civil rights litigation. The Court explained that, in the context of NAACP
objectives, litigation is a form of "political expression [that may be] the sole practicable
avenue" to effective political change. 371 U.S. at 429, 430, 438. The Court thus held that
"only a compelling state interest" could justify limiting such first amendment freedoms.
After carefully scrutinizing the state's interests in regulating "the traditionally illegal practices of barratry, maintenance and champerty," the Court concluded that the NAACP activities did not pose the dangers that "rules against solicitation frequently seek to prevent." Id.
at 439, 443.
In Schneider, the Court held unconstitutional a municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution of leaflets in or upon any street, sidewalk, or park. The municipality defended the
ordinance on the ground that it was designed to reduce litter. In rejecting this argument, the
Court explained that, in the context of such traditional public fora as streets and parks,
"the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify" the
ordinance's restriction on free expression. 308 U.S. at 162. Moreover, the Court observed
that "obvious methods of preventing littering" were available that would be less restrictive
of first amendment rights, such as "the punishment of those who actually throw papers on
the streets." Id.
As these decisions suggest, in assessing the extent to which a restriction substantially limits the opportunities for effective communication in the context of content-neutral balancing, the Court considers several factors not directly related to the substantiality of the restriction. It gives considerable weight, for example, to whether the speech takes place in a
public forum, presumably because the preservation of such public fora ensures at least minimal opportunities for expression for those without access to more conventional means of
expression. See generally Kalven, The Concept of The Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana,
1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SuP. CT. REv.
233. Similarly, the Court gives less weight to idiosyncratic means of expression than to
traditional ones. In effect, the Court is more concerned with preserving the widespread
availability of conventional means of communication than with protecting the use of unusual, but effective, alternatives. See, e.g., Ely, supra, at 1489-90.
6. At least two secondary concerns-disparate impact and improper motivation-also af-
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that such restrictions, by limiting the availability of particular
means of communication, can significantly impair the ability of in-

dividuals to communicate their views to others. This is, of course, a
central first amendment concern,' for to the extent that contentneutral restrictions actually reduce the total quantity of expression, they necessarily undermine the "search for truth," impede
meaningful participation in "self-governance," and frustrate individual "self-fulfillment." 8
The Court's content-neutral balancing is a sensible response to
this concern. Unlike a consistently deferential approach, which
would uphold every content-neutral restriction that rationally furthers legitimate governmental interests, the Court's approach critically examines restrictions that seriously threaten significant first
amendment interests. And unlike a rigid "clear and present danger" or "compelling interest" approach, which would invalidate almost all content-neutral restrictions, the Court's analysis does not
sacrifice legitimate governmental interests when significant first
amendment interests are not at issue. Thus, by assuring the availability of ample opportunities and outlets for expression, without
needlessly undermining competing governmental interests, the
Court has achieved a reasonable accommodation. One might quarrel with some of the Court's results," but the overall mode of analysis is defensible.
fect the Court's content-neutral balancing. See infra notes 108-48 and accompanying text.
7. But cf. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SEL-GovERNmENT 25
(1948).
8.The literature on the values underlying the first amendment is extensive. See generally
T. EMERSON, THE SysTEm oF FREE EXPRESSION (1970); A. MEIhKEJOHN, supra note 7; F.
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHmosoPmcAL ENQUIRY (1982); Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964 (1978); BeVier, The First Amendment
and PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle,30 STAN. L.
REv. 299 (1978); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521; Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of
the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A
Note on "The CentralMeaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191; Scanlon,
A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB.An'. 204 (1972); Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979).
9. Heffron and Greenburgh,for example, apply too deferential a standard. See supra note
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II. CONTENT-BASED ANALYSIS

In the content-based realm, the Court employs a markedly different mode of analysis. At the outset, the Court determines
whether the restricted speech is of only "low" first amendment
value, and thus deserving of only limited constitutional protection.
The "low" value theory first appeared in the famous dictum of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,0 in which the Court observed that
"certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech.., are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
'
morality."11
The precise factors that the Court considers in determining
whether a particular class of speech occupies only a "subordinate
position in the scale of First Amendment values" 12 remain somewhat obscure. The Court apparently focuses, however, on the extent to which the speech furthers the historical, political, and philosophical purposes that underlie the first amendment. In making
13
this determination, the Court applies a "defining out" approach.
That is, the Court begins with the presumption that the first
amendment protects all communication and then creates areas of
nonprotection only after it affirmatively finds that a particular
class of speech does not sufficiently further the underlying purposes of the first amendment. The Court, applying this approach,
has held that several classes of speech have only low first amendment value, including express incitement, 4 false statements of
fact,1 5 obscenity,16 commercial speech,1 7 fighting words,1 8 and child

10. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
11. Id. at 571-72 (footnote omitted).
12. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).

13. Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L.
REv. 265, 280-81 (1981).

14. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 544-46 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
BeVier, supra note 8 at 309-10; Bork, supra note 8, at 31.
15. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
16. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
17. E.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).

18. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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pornography.1"
The conclusion that a particular class of speech has only low
first amendment value does not mean that the speech is wholly
without constitutional protection or that the government may suppress it at will. Rather, the low value determination is merely the
first step in the Court's analysis, for once the Court concludes that
a particular class of speech is deserving of only limited first
amendment protection, it then employs a form of categorical balancing, through which it defines the precise circumstances in which
the speech may be restricted. In attempting to strike an appropriate "balance" for each class of low value speech, the Court considers a number of factors, including the relative value of the speech
and the risk of inadvertently chilling "high" value expression. 0
Applying this approach, the Court has articulated quite different
standards for different classes of low value speech. Express incitement, for example, may be suppressed only if it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action." ' Commercial speech, on the other hand,
may be suppressed if it is false or misleading, or if the restriction
"directly advances [a] substantial" governmental interest and 2is
"not more extensive than is necessary" to achieve that interest. 2
And obscenity, which is perhaps the least protected class of low
value expression, may be suppressed whenever a relatively undemanding scienter requirement is satisfied.23
Whatever the merits of the low value theory,u this theory is not

19.
20.
21.
22.

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
See supra notes 14-19.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
E.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566

(1980).

23. E.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973).
24. The low value theory necessarily involves the Court in the often controversial task of
assigning relative values to different classes of expression. This task, one commentator has
asserted, is foreclosed "by the basic theory of the First Amendment." T. EumxsON, supra
note 8, at 326. I do not agree. The low value theory, or some variant thereof, is an essential
concomitant of an effective system of free expression, for unless we are prepared to apply
the same standards to private blackmail, for example, that we apply to public political debate, some distinctions in terms of constitutional value are inevitable. Stephan, supra note
1, at 211-14. Moreover, the low value theory acts as a safety valve, enabling the Court to
deal sensibly with potentially harmful but relatively "unimportant" speech without diluting
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the focus of the content-based/content-neutral distinction. The
puzzling quality of the distinction arises not from the Court's analysis of low value speech, but from its treatment of high value expression. For in dealing with high value speech, the Court employs,
not a balancing approach akin to its content-neutral balancing, but
a far more speech-protective analysis. Indeed, in assessing the constitutionality of content-based restrictions on high value expression, the Court employs a standard that approaches absolute protection. In an oft-quoted declaration, for example, the Court
announced in Police Department v. Mosley "s that, "above all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 8 Although this declaration has proved to be
somewhat overstated,2 7 the Court has been remarkably true to its
word, for except when low value speech is at issue, the Court has
invalidated almost every content-based restriction that it has considered in the past quarter-century. 8 Thus, whether the Court
evaluates such restrictions by an "absolute protection" approach, a
"clear-and-present-danger" test, a "compelling government interest" standard, or some other formulation, it clearly applies a differthe protection accorded expression at the very heart of the guarantee. See Schauer, supra
note 13, at 285-88; Stephan, supra note 1, at 211-14. Thus, although the low value theory
poses dangers, and the Court's determinations of constitutional value must be scrutinized
carefully and critically, the theory is, on balance, a salutary one. The theory justifiably plays
a central role in the jurisprudence of the first amendment. See Stone, Restrictions of
Speech Because of its Content: The PeculiarCase of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U.
Cm. L. Rav. 81, 82 n.5 (1978).
25. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
26. Id. at 95.
27. The overstatenent, however, does not derive from the continued vitality of the low
value theory. Although some Justices and commentators have mistakenly viewed the low
value theory as inconsistent with Mosley, see, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427
U.S. 50, 67-70 (1976) (Stevens, J.); Stephan, supra note 1, at 236, neither Mosley nor the
Court's commitment to content-neutrality was intended to extend to low value expression.
28. The exceptions tend to fall within two categories. First, the Court has upheld some
laws that distinguish on the basis of subject-matter. See infra notes 160-79 and accompanying text; see generally Stone, supra note 24. Second, the Court occasionally has upheld
content-based laws in special contexts. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (public
employment); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (prisons); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military base). Even in these contexts, however,
the Court indicated that it would test content-based restrictions by more stringent standards than content-neutral restrictions.
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ent and more stringent standard to content-based than to contentneutral restrictions.
It has been suggested that the "most puzzling aspect of the distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions is
that either restriction reduces the sum total of information or
opinion disseminated.

29

Indeed, in many instances a content-neu-

tral restriction may more substantially reduce "the sum total of
information or opinion disseminated" than a related content-based
restriction. For example, a law banning all billboards restricts more
speech than a law banning Nazi billboards, and a law limiting the
political activities of public employees restricts more speech than a
law limiting the Socialist political activities of public employees.
Under current doctrine, however, the Court subjects the contentbased restrictions to a more stringent standard of justification than
the more suppressive content-neutral restrictions."0 Why?
In addressing this question, I shall focus first, in Parts I and
IV, on viewpoint-based restrictions-that is, laws that expressly restrict the communciation of particular ideas, viewpoints, or items
of information-for such restrictions are at the very core of the
content-based/content-neutral distinction. I shall then turn, in
Part V, to more peripheral forms of content-based restrictions,
such as laws that are neutral on their face but are applied on the
basis of "communicative impact," laws that restrict speech because
of its "subject matter," and other laws that restrict expression in a
"viewpoint-neutral" manner.
III. VIEWPOINT-BASED RESTRICTIONS

Consider two hypothetical statutes. First, suppose State X enacts a law prohibiting all billboards. Second, suppose State X enacts a law prohibiting all criticism of the antibillboard law. From
the standpoint of total reduction in expression, the two statutes
appear quite similar. 31 The antibillboard law is content-neutral,
29. Redish, supra note 3,at 128.
30. Indeed, in invalidating content-based restrictions, the Court has suggested that
"broader," content-neutral restrictions might be permissible. E.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 470-71 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 n.9 (1975).
31. Users of billboards often may be able to shift to alternative means of communication,
whereas critics of the antibillboard law may find expression of their views difficult without
violating the anticriticism statute. But the antibillboard law, unlike the anticriticism stat-
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however, and thus will be tested by a relatively moderate standard
of review; the anticriticism law is content-based, and thus will be
tested by a more stringent standard of justification.
The explanation is that the first amendment is concerned, not
only with the extent to which a law reduces the total quantity of
communication, but also-and perhaps even more fundamentally-with the extent to which the law distorts public debate. Although the anticriticism statute may produce only a small reduction in the total quantity of communication, the reduction falls
entirely on one side of the debate. Moreover, the potential distorting effect of the statute is dramatic, for it subjects critics of the
antibillboard law not to a mere marginal competitive disadvantage,
but to an effective prohibition on the expression of their view. Any
law that substantially prevents the communication of a particular
idea, viewpoint, or item of information violates the first amendment except, perhaps, in the most extraordinary of circumstances.
This is so, not because such a law restricts "a lot" of speech, but
because by effectively excising a specific message from public debate, it mutilates "the thinking process of the community" and is
thus incompatible with the central precepts of the first
amendment.82
My hypothetical anticriticism statute is not wholly hypothetical.
It is, rather, but one example of a broad range of content-based
ute, restricts speech across a broad range of ideas, and thus may interfere with more communication than the more limited anticriticism statute. Thus, what the antibiliboard statute
lacks in severity of impact it makes up for in scope, and the overall suppressive effect of the
two statutes is quite similar.
32. A. MMEKJOHN, PoLmcA FREEDOM 27 (1960). A law that significantly distorts "the
thinking process of the community" is obviously incompatible with the self-governance and
search for truth rationales, but the threat to the self-fulfillment rationale is less obvious.
Unlike the self-governance and search for truth theories, the self-fulfillment theory does not
turn on a competition among ideas. Nonetheless, a law that substantially restricts the expression of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of information undermines the self-fulfillment rationale because it effectively prevents individuals from expressing their views. This
does not, of course, distinguish content-based restrictions from content-neutral restrictions
that restrict expression to the same degree. The similarity is illusory, however, because content-neutral restrictions never significantly prevent the communication of all ideas, viewpoints, and items of information. If they did, the restrictions undoubtedly would be held
unconstitutional under ordinary content-neutral balancing. Thus, laws that substantially
prevent the expression of a particular message undermine the self-fulfillment rationale, not
because they distort public debate, but because they severely limit the opportunities for
self-expression.
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restrictions that attempt substantially to prevent the communication of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of information. These
include, for example, the Espionage Act of 1917, which prohibited
expression critical of the war and the draft;3 state statutes, such as
those enacted in the early twentieth century, which prohibited the
advocacy of criminal anarchy and criminal syndicalism; e the
Smith Act, which prohibited the advocacy of violent overthrow of
the government;3 5 laws and judicial orders prohibiting contumacious criticism of judicial decisions or other judicial conduct; 36 laws
and judicial orders prohibiting the publication of "confidential" information, ranging from the Pentagon Papers to inculpatory facts
about a criminal defendant to the identity of a juvenile offender or
rape victim; 37 and laws or judicial decisions prohibiting "invasions
of privacy" through public disclosure of "embarrassing" information."8 In these and other instances, content-based restrictions attempt substantially to eliminate particular ideas, viewpoints, or
items of information from public debate and thus undermine the
values and purposes underlying the first amendment.
It is true, of course, that content-neutral restrictions may also
have content-differential effects, for such restrictions may impair
the communication of some messages more than others.39 For example, the antibillboard statute may have a disproportionate impact upon those groups or individuals who tended previously to
use billboards. By their very nature, however, content-neutral restrictions limit the availability of only particularmeans of commu-

33. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217. See Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919). See also the Sedition Act of 1918, which made criminal the uttering, printing, writing, or publication of any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language intended
to cause contempt or scorn for the form of government of the United States. Act of May 16,
1918, ch. 75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
34. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
35. 54 Stat. 670, 671, ch. 439, 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (1946). See Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
36. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
37. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S.
308 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
38. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
39. See infra notes 108-29 and accompanying text.
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nication. They thus leave speakers free to shift to other means of
expression. As a result, content-neutral restrictions do not distort
public debate to the same degree as content-based restrictions that
substantially prevent the communication of particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information by all means. The uniquely powerful distorting effect of such content-based restrictions thus goes a
long way towards explaining the content-based/content-neutral
distinction.
IV.

MODEST VIEWPOINT-BASED RESTRICTIONS

The distorting effect, however, does not explain the distinction
in its entirety, for not every law that restricts the communication
of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of information substantially prevents the message from being communicated. To the contrary, such restrictions are often limited in scope, restricting expression in only narrowly defined circumstances. For example, laws
that prohibit the public destruction of a draft card as an expression of opposition to the draft, the display of the swastika within
100 feet of a synagogue on Yom Kippur, or the advocacy of homosexuality on any billboard are viewpoint-based, but restrict expression only in terms of time, place, or manner. They are thus unlikely to distort public debate to the same degree as viewpointbased restrictions that more pervasively restrict the communication of particular messages. One might expect, therefore, that the
Court would test these more modest viewpoint-based restrictions
by less stringent standards, similar to the standards applied in the
content-neutral context. The Court, however, has applied the content-based/content-neutral distinction, and the stringent standards
of content-based analysis, even to these more modest viewpointbased restrictions.
Consider, for example, Schacht v. United States," Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro,4 1 and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.4 2 In Schacht, the Court held unconstitutional a
federal statute permitting actors to wear the uniform of an armed
force of the United States in a theatrical or motion-picture produc-

40. 398 U.S. 58 (1970).

41. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
42. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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tion only "if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed
force." Although the statute imposed only a modest restriction on
the ability of individuals to oppose governmental policy, and although the government could constitutionally make "it an offense
' the Court held
to wear our military uniforms without authority,"43
the statute invalid because it restricted expression on the basis of
content. In Linmark, the Court held unconstitutional an ordinance
that attempted to stem the flight of white homeowners from racially integrated neighborhoods by prohibiting the posting of real
estate "For Sale" signs. Although conceding that the ordinance
"restrict[ed] only one method of communication," the Court emphasized that the ordinance "proscribed particular types of signs
based on their content" and thus held that it must be tested, not
as a content-neutral "'time, place, or manner'" restriction, but
"on the basis of the township's interest in regulating the content of
the communication."'

4

In Nebraska Press Association, the Court

held unconstitutional a state court order restraining the press from
publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions or other facts
strongly implicative of a murder defendant. Although noting that
the order expired by its own terms when the jury was impaneled,
and that it thus merely postponed and did not prohibit publication,45 the Court nonetheless employed the demanding standards
of content-based analysis.
Thus, in these and other decisions,48 the Court has consistently
applied the stringent standards of content-based analysis even to
relatively modest viewpoint-based restrictions. Why? At least four
possible explanations come to mind.
A. Equality
It has been suggested that the concept of equality "lies at the
heart of the first amendment's protections against government reg43. 398 U.S. at 61.
44. 431 U.S. at 93-94.
45. See 427 U.S. at 560.
46. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975);
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). But see, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres,
427 U.S. 50 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
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ulation of the content of speech. ' 47 Indeed, it has been argued
that, "[j]ust as the prohibition of government-imposed discrimination on the basis of race is central to equal protection analysis,
protection against governmental discrimination on the basis of
speech content is central among first amendment values."4 s There
is, indeed, a seemingly obvious connection between the contentbased/content-neutral distinction and the concept of equality.
When government restricts only certain ideas, viewpoints, or items
of information, people wishing to express the restricted messages
receive "unequal" treatment. When government restricts speech in
a content-neutral manner, however, everyone is treated "equally."
Moreover, an equality-based theory of the content-based/contentneutral distinction might explain the Court's use of the same standards of justification for all viewpoint-based restrictions, regardless of their potential to distort public debate. For just as we
"strictly scrutinize" any law that discriminates on the basis of race,
whether it denies an important or trivial benefit, so too must we
"strictly scrutinize" any law that discriminates on the basis of content, whether it has a substantial or only a modest impact on public debate. It is the fact of discrimination, not the impact on public
debate, that warrants "strict scrutiny."
It is not, however, that simple. In fact, the Court employs at
least two quite distinct modes of content-based analysis, only one
of which focuses explicity on "equality." In the more traditional
mode of analysis, the Court asks only whether the restricted
speech is sufficiently harmful to justify the restriction. The Court
does not concern itself with whether other speech is similarly restricted. In Schenck v. United States,4 9 for example, the Court
asked whether the restricted speech created a "clear and present
danger." The Court did not ask whether the Espionage Act embodied an impermissible "inequality" because it failed to restrict
other, perhaps equally dangerous, messages. Similarly, in Whitney
v. California,"° the Court, in upholding California's criminal syndicalism statute, focused only on the dangers of the restricted speech
47. Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the First Amendment, 43 U. CHi. L. REv.
20, 21 (1975). See Stone, supra note 5, at 272-80.
48. Karst, supra note 47, at 35.
49. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
50. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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and rather cavalierly rejected an assertion that the Act unconstitutionally distinguished between those who advocated "a resort to
violent and unlawful methods as a means of changing industrial
and political conditions" and those who advocated "a resort to
those methods as a means of maintaining such conditions."51 More
recently, in such cases as the Pentagon Papers Case,52 Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart,53 and Landmark Communications v.
Virginia54 the Court has routinely applied the "compelling interest" and "clear and present danger" standards without asking the
logically preliminary question55 whether the challenged restrictions
embodied impermissible "inequalities" because they prohibited the
publication of only specific types of "confidential" information.
What these cases suggest, then, is that although a concern with
inequality may underlie the content-based/content-neutral distinction, the concern is often submerged, and there exists a traditional
and well-founded mode of content-based analysis that pays no explicit attention to the equality issue.
The second mode of content-based analysis focuses explicitly on
"equality." This mode of analysis, which has come to the fore only
recently, 56 emphasizes underinclusion as a basis for invalidation.
The key issue is not whether the restricted speech is sufficiently
harmful to justify its restriction, but whether the government may
constitutionally restrict only the speech restricted. Police Department v. Mosley,57 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville," and Widmar v. Vincent59 are illustrative.
In Mosley, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance that prohibited picketing or demonstrating on a
51. Id. at 369.
52. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
53. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
54. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
55. See Farber, supra note 3, at 748 n.100; Karst, supra note 47, at 65-68.
56. Although the Court referred to equality in several early opinions, see, e.g., Fowler v.
Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951), and
equality was the basis of an oft-cited concurring opinion, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581
(1965) (Black, J., concurring), the Court did not fully enunciate the principle until 1972. See
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See generally Karst, supra note 47, at 26-29.
57. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
58. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
59. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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public way within 150 feet of a school building while the school
was in session. The ordinance was not content-neutral, however,
for it expressly exempted "peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute." 0 Without deciding whether the ordinance, absent the labor-picketing exemption, would be a permissible content-neutral restriction, the Court invalidated the ordinance
because it described prohibited picketing, "not in terms of time,
place, and manner," but in terms of content. 1 Although conceding
that cities may have a substantial interest in prohibiting picketing
that disrupts a school, the Court held that Chicago may not ban
nonlabor picketing "unless that picketing is clearly more disruptive
than the picketing Chicago ... permits." '
In Erznoznik, the Court held unconstitutional an ordinance that
prohibited the exhibition of films containing nudity by drive-in
movie theaters if the screen was visible from a public street or
public place.6 s Without deciding whether "a narrowly drawn nondiscriminatory traffic regulation" requiring the screening of all
drive-in theaters from the view of motorists would "be a reasona' the Court
ble exercise of police power," 64
held that "even a traffic
regulation cannot discriminate on the basis of content unless there
are clear reasons for the distinctions." 65 The ordinance, the Court
held, was "strikingly underinclusive," for there was "no reason to
think that a wide variety of other scenes in the customary screen
diet, ranging from soap opera to violence, would be any less distracting to the passing motorist." 6
And in Widmar, the Court held unconstitutional a policy of the
University of Missouri that allowed registered student groups to
use university facilities, but that prohibited such groups from using the facilities "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching. '67 The Court explained that the "Constitution forbids a
State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

408 U.S. at 93 (quoting CHICAGO, ILL.,
408 U.S. at 99.
Id. at 100.
422 U.S. at 217.
Id. at 215 n.13.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 214-15.
454 U.S. at 263 (citation omitted).

MUNICIPAL CODE

ch. 193-1(i) (1968)).
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the public, even if it was not required to create the forum in the
first place."' 8 Here, the Court reasoned, the university had voluntarily created such a forum, and to justify "discriminatory ,exclusion" because of the "content of a group's intended speech," the
university would have to "show that its regulation [was] necessary
to serve a compelling state interest and that it [was] narrowly
drawn to achieve that end."6 The Court held that the university
had not met that standard. T°
The Court's express recognition in the Mosley line of cases of
the nexus between free expression and equality has had a generally
salutary effect, for as Justice Jackson recognized in his celebrated
concurrence in Railway Express Agency v. New York,7 1 there is no
more effective way "to assure that laws will be just than to require
that laws be equal in operation.

7

2

There are dangers in the em-

phasis on equality, however, and those dangers should not be overlooked. By focusing on equality, the Court may invite government
to "equalize," not by permitting more speech, but by adopting
even more "suppressive" content-neutral restrictions. This result,
one might argue, is hardly consistent with the first amendment. As
Justice Rehnquist has observed, under the Court's approach, "the
State would fare better by adopting more restrictive means, a judicial incentive I had thought this Court would hesitate to afford. '7 3
Moreover, an undue emphasis on equality may lead the Court to
sustain "equal" restrictions on expression without sufficient consideration of the other dangers such restrictions might pose. This
tendency is evident in several recent decisions in which the Court,
in upholding a number of potentially troublesome content-neutral
restrictions, stressed repeatedly that the restrictions were, after all,
"content-neutral."' Finally, in several recent decisions, the Court
68. Id. at 267-68.
69. Id. at 269-70.
70. The Court has not invalidated all content-based restrictions on the basis of inequality.
Occasionally, the Court has sustained subject matter restrictions. See infra notes 160-79 and
accompanying text.
71. 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 113.
73. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 445, 475 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74. E.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
132 (1981); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648-49
(1981).
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has relied explicitly on the equal protection clause as well as, and
even instead of, the first amendment.7 5 The degree of scrutiny that
is appropriate in testing the constitutionality of content-based restrictions, however, is fundamentally a first amendment issue. Invocation of the equal protection clause adds nothing constructive
to the analysis. It may, however, by appearing to "simplify" matters, deflect attention from the central constitutional issue.
These caveats aside, the question remains whether the equality
concept justifies the use of especially stringent standards of review
to test the constitutionality of viewpoint-based restrictions that do
not substantially prevent the communication of particular ideas,
viewpoints, or items of information. In addressing this question, it
is important to note that the Court's reliance on equality affects its
analysis in two quite distinct ways.
First, recognition that a restriction is underinclusive may effectively undercut the asserted importance of the government interest
said to support the restriction. In Mosley, for example, the governmental interest in preventing the disruption of schools may be sufficient to justify a content-neutral restriction, but it loses force
when the government creates an exemption. Similarly, in
Erznoznik, the governmental interest in promoting traffic safety
may justify a content-neutral restriction, but loses force when the
government applies the restriction only to some speech that poses
the danger. In such circumstances, content-based restrictions may
be unconstitutional, not because they are more "dangerous" than
content-neutral restrictions, but because they are more difficult to
justify. This "impeaching" effect, it should be noted, is not always
present. In Widmar, for example, the university's interest in excluding religious organizations-maintaining a strict separation of
church and state-is tied specifically to the particular speech restricted, and the content-based nature of the restriction does not
significantly undermine the strength of the state's interest.70 When
the impeaching effect is present, however, it is clearly sensible for

75. E.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). In other cases, however, the Court
has eschewed reliance on the equal protection clause. E.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
76. See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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the Court to take it into account, and this may explain why some
content-based restrictions must be invalidated even though more
"suppressive" content-neutral restrictions might be sustained. It
does not, however, explain why content-based restrictions are
tested by especially stringent standards of justification.
Second, the Court uses the equality concept to determine the
appropriate standard of review. That is, once the Court characterizes the restriction as "content-based," it shifts immediately to the
more stringent content-based standard of justification. This, of
course, is the nub of the issue. Does the concern with equality explain this shift? The answer, I submit, is "no."
The problem, quite simply, is that restrictions on expression are
rife with "inequalities," many of which have nothing whatever to
do with content. The ordinance at issue in Mosley, for example,
restricted picketing near schools, but left unrestricted picketing
near hospitals, libraries, courthouses, and private homes. The ordinance at issue in Erznoznik restricted drive-in theaters that are
visible from a public street, but did not restrict billboards. And the
policy at issue in Widmar permitted students to use university facilities for speech purposes, but did not grant similar access to
other members of the community. Whatever the effect of these
content-neutral inequalities on first amendment analysis, they are
not scrutinized in the same way as content-based inequalities. Not
all inequalities, in other words, are equal. And although the concern with equality may support the content-based/content-neutral
distinction, it does not in itself have much explanatory power. To
determine why some inequalities are more bothersome than others,
77
we must look elsewhere.
B. Communicative Impact
A second possible explanation for the content-based/contentneutral distinction derives from the notion that the government ordinarily may not restrict speech because of its communicative impact-that is, because of "a fear of how people will react to what
'78
the speaker is saying.
77. See generally Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. RE V. 537 (1982).
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 111 (1980); see also L. TRIE, supra note 5, at 580;
Ely, supra note 5, at 1497; The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARv. L. REV. 17, 235 (1981)

78. J. ELY,
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Most laws that are content-neutral on their face do not turn on
communicative impact. For example, the government may restrict
the distribution of leaflets to reduce litter, the use of loudspeakers
to reduce noise, and the size and location of billboards to improve
the aesthetics of the community. Most content-based laws, on the
other hand, do turn on communicative impact. For example, the
government may ban the advocacy of the violent overthrow of government because such advocacy might persuade individuals to engage in unlawful acts, it may restrict the display of the swastika in
predominantly Jewish communities because such displays might
offend the sensibilities of residents and trigger a violent response,
and it may prohibit the wearing of "Ban the Bomb" buttons in
schools because such buttons might distract students from their
schoolwork.
The content-neutral and content-based concepts do not, however, coincide perfectly with communicative impact. Some laws
that are content-neutral on their face are applied on the basis of
communicative impact. For example, a law prohibiting any person
from making any speech that may provoke a breach of the peace is
content-neutral on its face, but turns in application on the reaction
of individuals "to what the speaker is saying." Similarly, some laws
are content-based on their face but do not turn in application on
communicative impact. For example, a law excluding communists
from employment in defense facilities might be based on a concern
that communists would perform their duties in an undesirable
manner,7 1 and a law prohibiting the display of partisan political

messages in certain public facilities might be based on a concern
that the display of such messages would involve the government in
especially troublesome "administrative" problems.80
To what extent, if any, does the communicative impact concept
explain the content-based/content-neutral distinction? There are
several formulations of the communicative impact theory. The first
formulation treats as content-based any law that is either contentbased on its face or turns in application on communicative impact.
[hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court].
79. E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); see also Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
80. E.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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This formulation assumes that laws that are content-based on
their face require strict scrutiny whether they turn on communicative impact and thus employs the communicative impact concept
to expand the class of content-based restrictions. Although I shall
return later to this formulation,"' it is of no concern here, for it
does not rely on communicative impact to justify the use of stringent standards of review for laws that are content-based on their
face.
The second formulation also treats as content-based any law
that is either content-based on its face or turns in application on
communicative impact but, unlike the first formulation, assumes
that the communicative impact concept justifies the use of stringent standards of review for all restrictions that it treats as content-based. This formulation is obviously unsatisfactory, for as we
have already seen, not all laws that are content-based on their face
turn on communicative impact.82 This formulation thus puts more
weight on the communicative impact concept than it can logically
bear.
The third formulation treats as content-based any restriction
that turns on communicative impact. This formulation uses communicative impact to define the category of content-based restrictions, and thus excludes from this category all laws that do not
turn on communicative impact, even if they are content-based on
their face. 88 Whatever the merits of this formulation, it does not
comport with the Court's own understanding of the content-based/
content-neutral distinction.84 There are, quite simply, too many
81. For further discussion of this formulation, see infra notes 149-59 and accompanying
text.
82. See infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.

83. Although these three formulations are analytically distinct, they are often confused.
For various statements of the communicative impact theory, see J. ELY, supra note 78, at
111; L. TamE, supra note 5, at 580, 679, 683; Brudney, Business Corporations and Stock-

holders' Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 250-51 (1981); Ely, supra
note 5, at 1497; Farber, supra note 3, at 743-46; Redish, supra note 3, at 116-17; The Supreme Court, supra note 78, at 237-39.

84. On several occasions, the Court has invoked the communicative impact theory in a
manner consistent with the third formulation. This has occurred in three types of cases.
First, in several decisions invalidating laws that were content-based on their face, the Court
expressly noted that the challenged law turned directly on communicative impact. In
Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), for example, the Court
observed that the township had "proscribed particular types of signs based on their con-
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decisions to the contrary. To cite just three of many possible examples, in Police Department v. Mosley,8 5 perhaps the seminal content-based/content-neutral decision, the Court treated as contentbased an ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet of a
school, except peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor
dispute, even though the city sought to defend the ordinance, not
in terms of communicative impact, but on the ground that nonlabor picketers were themselves more prone to violence than labor
picketers.8 6 Similarly, in City of Madison Joint School DistrictNo.

tent," not because of any "secondary effects," but "because it fears their 'primary effect'--that they will cause those receiving the information to act upon it." Id. at 94. Similarly, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), the Court
held that a Commission order unconstitutionally prohibited public utility companies from
including inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy. The Court noted that the
government attempted to justify "the ban expressly on the basis that the speech might be
harmful to consumers." Id. at 540 n.9.
Second, in several decisions upholding laws that were not content-based on their face, the
Court expressly noted that the challenged law did not turn on communicative impact. In
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting
any person from knowingly destroying a draft card. The Court emphasized that the law was
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression," a phrase that has since been construed to
mean "unrelated to communicative impact." Id. at 377. See Ely, supra note 5, at 1497-1502;
The Supreme Court, supra note 78, at 236. For a critical view of this interpretation of
O'Brien, see Farber, supra note 3, at 743-44 & n.90.
Finally, in several decisions upholding laws that were content-based on their face, the
Court noted that the challenged law did not turn on communicative impact. In American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), for example, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, which withheld the benefits
of various provisions of the Act from any labor union whose officers failed to execute an
affidavit concerning membership in the Communist Party. The Court in Douds explained
that the clear and present danger standard was inapplicable because the statute was
designed to prevent unlawful conduct that might be undertaken by members of the Party
and not to prevent "the dissemination of Communist doctrine ... because Congress fears
the consequences of speech." Id. at 396. More recently, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the Court upheld a Detroit zoning ordinance that restricted the
permissible location of movie theaters exhibiting sexually explicit movies. The plurality
pointed out that the city's goal was to prevent the secondary effects attributable to theaters
showing sexually explicit films, and not to protect "its citizens from exposure to unwanted,
'offensive' speech." Id. at 71 n.34 (Stevens, J.). Notably, one context in which the Court has
not invoked the communicative impact concept is the situation in which commentators believe the concept has its greatest force-where the restriction does not limit a particular
message expressly, but rather turns in application on communicative impact. See, e.g., Ely,
supra note 5, at 1500 n.72. See also infra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
85. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
86. Id. at 100 & n.7.
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8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,87 the Court
treated as content-based a Commission order prohibiting the board
of education from hearing nonunion teachers on matters subject to
collective bargaining, even though the Commission defended its order, not in terms of communicative impact, but on the ground that
the order was necessary to prevent "'chaos in labor management
9 the Court treated
relations.' "88 And in New York v. Ferber,"
as
content-based a law prohibiting "child pornography," even though
the state defended the law, not in terms of communicative impact,
but on the ground that the law was necessary to protect children
who participated in "sexual performances." ' 0 Thus, the third formulation of the communicative impact theory offers a definition of
the content-based/content-neutral distinction quite different from
the Court's own conception, for the Court routinely treats laws
that are content-based on their face as content-based whether or
not the state's justification turns on communicative impact.
The final formulation of the communicative impact theory provides that any governmental effort to justify a restriction on
speech in terms of the communicative impact of the restricted expression must be tested by stringent standards of review.9 1 This
formulation treats communicative impact as a sufficient, but not a
necessary, condition for the invocation of content-based analysis.
This formulation does not explain the content-based/content-neutral distinction in its entirety, for as we have seen, some contentbased restrictions are not based on communicative impact. Most
content-based restrictions are based on communicative impact,
however, and if this formulation is supportable it would explain
much of the distinction.
Of course, the question remains: should a law that is contentbased on its face be tested by stringent standards of review, even if
87. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
88. Id. at 173 (quoting City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 69 Wis. 2d 200, 212, 231 N.W.2d 206, 213 (1975), rev'd, 429 U.S.
167 (1976)).
89. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
90. See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
91. The application of this formulation to laws that are facially content-neutral is examined infra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
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it will not substantially distort public debate, because the government attempts to justify it on the basis of "a fear of how people
will react to what the speaker is saying"? Should government efforts to justify restrictions of speech in terms of communicative
impact be viewed differently from other justifications for restricting expression?9 2 To explore this line of inquiry, we must examine
the dynamic of communicative impact. That is, we must determine
what we mean when we say "how people will react to what the
speaker is saying." As we shall see, there are essentially three such
"reactions," and an analysis of these reactions sheds considerable
light on the nature of the communicative impact concern.
In the most common communicative impact situation, the government attempts to restrict expression because the expression
may persuade individuals to act in an undesirable or unlawful
manner. For example, the government might prohibit any person
from distributing antiwar leaflets within 100 feet of an enlistment
center in order to prevent persons from being persuaded not to
enlist in the armed forces. Is such a law, despite its modest suppressive effect, unconstitutional? May government legitimately restrict speech for this reason?
The Court has long embraced an "antipaternalistic" understanding of the first amendment. It has observed, for example, that the
first amendment assumes that ideas and information are not in
themselves "harmful, that people will perceive their own best in92. One commentator has suggested that "where messages are proscribed because they
are too dangerous, balancing tests inevitably become intertwined with the ideological predispositions of those doing the balancing," Ely, supra note 5, at 1501, and that "the hazards of
political distortion and judicial acquiescence" are thus "at their peak [when] the evil the
state is seeking to avert is one that is thought to arise from the particular dangers of the

message being conveyed." J. ELY, supra note 78, at 111. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at
584 n.27; Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression,40 U. Pirr. L. REv.
519, 534-35, 541-42 (1979); The Supreme Court, supra note 78, at 237-39. Although, "the

hazards of political distortion and judicial acquiescence" may help to explain the distinction
between content-based and content-neutral restrictions generally, see infra notes 108-48
and accompanying text, they do not justify special concern with communicative impact
within the realm of laws that are content-based on their face. Within that realm, the
hazards flow, not from the government's attempt to justify the restriction in terms of com-

municative impact, but from the very fact that the restriction expressly distinguishes on the
basis of content. See Farber, supra note 3, at 745 n.94. It is noteworthy that even contentneutral restrictions may involve some "hazards of political distortion." See infra notes 10829 and accompanying text.

19831

CONTENT REGULATION

terests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather
than to close them."' 3 "The people in our democracy," the Court
has explained, "are entrusted with the responsibility for judging
and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments, 9 4 and
"if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced [during the course of public debate], it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First
Amendment."9 5
The point, of course, is not that the government may not restrict
expression that individuals might find useful in making personal or
political decisions, for that concern, although central to the first
amendment, clearly implicates content-neutral as well as contentbased restrictions on expression. The point, rather, is that the government ordinarily may not restrict the expression of particular
ideas, viewpoints, or items of information because it does not trust
its citizens to make wise or desirable decisions if they are exposed
to such expression. This "highly paternalistic" view, as the Court
has recognized,96 is at odds with the notion of free expression. The
Court's antipaternalistic understanding of the first amendment,
therefore, seems well-founded in the philosophical and historical
underpinnings of the constitutional guarantee.9 7

93. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976).
94. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978).
95. Id. at 792. See also Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97
(1977); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
96. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
97. See generally, Scanlon, supra note 8; Wellington, supra note 8, at 1135-36; Stone,
supra note 24, at 103-04. The Court has invoked this antipaternalistic understanding on
several occasions to invalidate content-based restrictions. In Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959), for example, the Court overturned a New
York statute that required the denial of a license to exhibit any motion picture that
presented adultery "as being right and desirable." The Court explained that by preventing
"the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture adovcates an idea, [New York] has
thus struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty." Id. at 688. The first
amendment's "guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or
shared by a majority." Id. at 689. Moreover, the Court declared that even where, as in
Kingsley, the speech advocated "conduct proscribed by law" and the restriction was limited
to a single medium of expression, the speech could not constitutionally be suppressed
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This antipaternalistic understanding of the first amendment explains, at least in part, the Court's use of stringent standards of
review to test the constitutionality of content-based restrictions
that the government attempts to justify in paternalistic terms. Because paternalistic justifications are constitutionally disfavored,
the government may restrict expression for paternalistic reasons in
only the most compelling circumstances, if ever. And this is so
even if the restriction does not substantially prevent the communication of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of information, for
the Court's use of stringent standards of review in such cases derives, not from a concern about the potential distorting effects of
the restriction, but from the disfavored status of the government's

justification.
In the second, and next most common, communicative impact
situation, government attempts to restrict expression because the
ideas or information communicated may offend others or may induce those who are offended to react in a hostile or disruptive
manner. For example, to avoid offense to passersby and to prevent
possible violent retaliation, a city might prohibit any person from
displaying a swastika within 100 feet of a synagogue on Yom Kippur. Is such a law, despite its modest suppressive effect, unconstitutional? May government legitimately restrict speech for this
reason?
The Court has long maintained that the first amendment does
"'where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the
advocacy would be immediately acted on."' Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
Similarly, in Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), the Court
held that a township could not prohibit the posting of real estate "For Sale" signs. The
township maintained that this restriction was necessary to prevent homeowners from panicking and leaving town contrary to their self-interest and the corporate interest of the
township. The Court rejected this "'highly paternalistic"' argument, and explained that it
"'is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the
dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us."' Id.
at 97 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976)). Thus, even where, as in Linmark, the speech was essentially commercial and the restriction was limited to only a single medium of expression, the government
could not constitutionally "enable its citizens to find their self-interest" by denying them
access to truthful information. Id. at 97. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978).
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not permit government to prohibit the public expression of views
merely because they are offensive or unpopular."8 As the Court has
observed, "[i]t is firmly settled that under our Constitution the
public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because
the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers." 9 Indeed, the Court has consistently held that "[t]he ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely
to protect others from hearing it is... dependent upon a showing
that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." 10 0 "Any broader view of this authority,"
the Court has explained, "would effectively empower a majority to
silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections."1 0 1
Moreover, the Court has embraced a similarly critical view of governmental efforts to restrict speech because the ideas or information expressed might trigger a hostile audience response. In fact,
the Court has not sustained a restriction on this basis since its de10 2
cision in Feiner v. New York.
The Court's reluctance to accept the "heckler's veto," and its refusal to permit one group of citizens effectively to "censor" the expression of others because they dislike or are prepared violently to
oppose their ideas, seem well-grounded in the central precepts of

98. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1975); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
99. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
100. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1975). See generally Stone, supra note 5, at 262-80.
101. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
102. 340 U.S. 315 (1951). In Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), and Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), the Court held that the leaders of civil rights demonstrations
could not constitutionally be convicted of breach of the peace even though the demonstrations had at least the potential to trigger violent responses from hostile onlookers. The
Court found that the Constitution protected speech against restriction in such circumstances "'unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive
evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."' 372 U.S. at 237 (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949)). See also Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S.
111 (1969); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 lL 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21
(1978).
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the first amendment. 10 3 Thus, "intolerance-based" justifications for
restricting expression, like paternalistic justifications, are constitutionally disfavored, even if the restriction does not substantially
prevent the communication of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item
of information.
The third, and least common, communicative impact situation
involves government efforts to restrict expression because the ideas
or information restricted may have unusual "distracting" or "attracting" effects. For example, a city whose residents are predominantly Jewish may ban the display of the swastika on any billboard because of its special distracting effect upon motorists,"0 a
school may prohibit students 'from wearing "Ban the Bomb" buttons in school because of their especially distracting effect upon
other students, 10 5 or a city may forbid any person from making
anti-abortion speeches in public parks because such speeches have
tended in the past to attract unusually large crowds that require
special policing. 106 Are such laws, despite their modest suppressive
effects, unconstitutional because they turn on "communicative
impact"?
The critical issue is whether the government's interest in restricting speech because its message is especially "distracting" or
"attracting" has the same constitutionally disfavored status as paternalistic and intolerance-based justifications. In many instances,
of course, the extraordinary attracting or distracting quality of
speech may stem from its offensiveness, and to that extent, the
Court should treat the government's justification as intolerancebased. In other instances, however, the Apecial attracting or distracting effects may have nothing to do with offensiveness, but
may derive instead from the unusually interesting or provocative
nature of the speech. Although the matter is not without doubt, I
do not think it inherently illegitimate for government to restrict
speech because the ideas or information have undesirable at103. See H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140-45 (1966); Bollinger,
The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy" Case and Free Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L.
REv. 617, 629-31 (1982).

104. Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
105. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
106. See The Supreme Court, supra note 78, at 237; cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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tracting or distracting effects, where those effects are not due to
the offensiveness of the speech. Indeed, unlike paternalistic and intolerance-based justifications, this justification for restricting
speech does not seem any less legitimate than those justifications
107
that are wholly unrelated to communicative impact.
What, then, has this inquiry into the "dynamic of communicative impact" accomplished? For one thing, we have discovered why
communicative impact matters. We care about communicative impact, not because government is attempting to restrict speech because of "a fear of how people will react to what the speaker is
saying," but because, when government does so, it almost invariably relies upon constitutionally disfavored justifications to support
the restriction. Moreover, we have identified an explanation for at
least part of the content-based/content-neutral distinction. For
when government attempts to justify a content-based restriction
on paternalistic or intolerance-based grounds, the restriction must
be tested by stringent standards of review, whether or not it significantly distorts public debate. This does not, of course, explain the
content-based/content-neutral distinction in its entirety. It does,
however, unravel at least part of the puzzle.
C. Distortion of Public Debate
A third possible explanation for the content-based/content-neutral distinction derives from the fact that content-based restrictions, by their very nature, restrict the communication of only
some messages and thus affect public debate in a content-differential manner. Indeed, as we have seen, some content-based restrictions so substantially impair the communication of particular
ideas, viewpoints, or items of information that, for that reason
alone, they are presumptively invalid. 10 8 We are concerned here,
however, with viewpoint-based restrictions that do not substantially impair the communication of particular messages. Because
these more modest viewpoint-based restrictions leave open alternative channels of communication, they do not as dramatically skew
the thought processes of the community. The question, then, is
107. As a practical matter, the issue borders on the trivial, for the number of cases likely
to fall within this category seems vanishingly small.
108. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
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whether the disparate effects of these more modest viewpointbased restrictions can explain the content-based/content-neutral
distinction.
There are two elements to this inquiry. First, do the relatively
limited content-differential effects of modest viewpoint-based restrictions distinguish them from content-neutral restrictions? And
second, is the difference, if one exists, sufficiently important to explain the doctrinal distinction?
Although neutral on their face, content-neutral restrictions often
have "unequal effects on various types of messages.""" 9 For example, a law banning all street demonstrations may have a disproportionate impact upon those who rely on such demonstrations to
communicate their views; a law banning the distribution of leaflets
in welfare offices may have a disproportionate impact upon those
who rely on leaflets to communicate with welfare recipients; and a
content-neutral disclosure requirement may have a disproportionate impact upon those with controversial or unpopular views. Indeed, most content-neutral restrictions have at least some de facto
content-differential effects, and although such effects may be less
severe than those associated with content-based restrictions that
substantially prevent the communication of particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information, they are at least arguably analogous to the content-differential effects associated with more modest viewpoint-based restrictions. Thus, in assessing the extent to
which the content-differential effects of modest viewpoint-based
restrictions might explain the Court's use of stringent standards of
justification to test the constitutionality of such restrictions, it may
be useful to examine the Court's analysis of the content-differential effects of content-neutral restrictions. For if the Court considers the content-differential effects of content-neutral restrictions to
be a serious first amendment problem, that would help explain the
Court's approach to viewpoint-based restrictions.
There are two means by which the Court might manifest a concern with the de facto content-differential effects of content-neu109. Karst, supra note 47, at 36; see also Stone, supra note 24, at 102-03; Redish, supra

note 3, at 131. Content-neutral restrictions also may have de facto content-differential effects insofar as they are enforced selectively in a content-differential manner. See Stone,
supra note 24, at 102.
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tral restrictions. First, the -Court might use an especially stringent
standard of review for content-neutral restrictions that have content-differential effects. Second, it might hold that groups or individuals who are disproportionately disadvantaged by a particular
content-neutral restriction are constitutionally entitled to an exemption from the ordinary operation of that restriction.
In two quite distinct situations, the Court has demonstrated a
concern with the de facto content-differential effects of contentneutral restrictions. First, in the public forum context, the Court
has recognized that restrictions on the distribution of leaflets and
similar means of communication may have a disproportionate effect upon those who, for reasons of finances or ideology, do not
have ready access to more conventional means of communication. 110 In such circumstances, the Court has reviewed restrictions
on such traditional but unconventional means of communication
by a more stringent standard than other content-neutral restrictions. Indeed, the public forum doctrine is in part a reflection of
this concern. 1
Second, in the disclosure context, the Court has recognized that
content-neutral disclosure requirements may have especially harsh
consequences for groups or individuals with controversial or unpopular views and that such requirements may thus be unconstitutional as applied to such groups or individuals. In Bates v. City of
Little Rock, n 2 for example, the Court considered the constitutionality of several ordinances requiring all organizations operating
within the city to disclose their membership lists to municipal authorities in order to facilitate the enforcement of the tax laws. The
Court held that the disclosure requirement was unconstitutional as
applied to the NAACP. Noting that there was substantial evidence
that "public identification of persons in the community as mem110. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting); Martin v. City

of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943); cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 552
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 563 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See generally L. TRmE,
supra note 5, at 683; Kalven, supra note 5, at 30; Karst, supra note 47, at 36; Stone, supra

note 24, at 102.
111. See L. ThMBn, supra note 5, at 683; Karst, supra note 47, at 40-41; Stone, supra note
5. Thus, the public forum concept may be a means of ensuring at least a minimum opportunity for effective expression for those individuals who lack access to more conventional
means of communication.
112. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
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bers of the [NAACP] had been followed by harassment and threats
of bodily harm," and that "fear of community hostility and economic reprisals . . . had discouraged new members from joining
• . . and induced former members to withdraw," the Court con-

cluded that the compulsory disclosure of NAACP membership lists
would work a significant interference with the freedom of association of NAACP members.11 The Court held that, in such circumstances, "the State may prevail1 4only upon showing a subordinating
'1
interest which is compelling.

Although the Court's concern with the de facto content-differential effects of content-neutral restrictions in the public forum and
disclosure contexts might suggest that such content-differential effects play a significant role in the Court's analysis of content-neutral restrictions, this is not in fact the case. Indeed, these are the
only situations in which the Court has emphasized the content-differential effects of content-neutral restrictions. In other situations,
it has essentially ignored the issue.
In upholding content-neutral restrictions governing expression in
publicly owned facilities that do not constitute public fora, for example, the Court has generally disregarded content-differential effects. In Heffron v. InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness,115 the Court upheld a Minnesota State Fair rule prohibiting
any group or individual from distributing materials, including written matter, except from a fixed, rented location, without giving any
113. Id. at 524, 523.
114. Id. at 524. See also Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961);

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Similarly, in Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 103 S. Ct. 416 (1982), the Court held that Ohio could not
apply the disclosure provisions of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law to the Socialist Workers Party, a minor political party that had historically been harassed by private
individuals and government officials. The law required every candidate for political office to
report the names of contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements. The Court explained that the disclosure requirements potentially impaired first amendment interests in a
manner substantially greater when applied to the Socialist Workers Party, because "'fears
of reprisals may deter contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive, [resulting in a] reduction in the free circulation of ideas."' Id. at 420 (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976)). See also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564 (1983). The
issue of constitutionally compelled exemptions is explored in Stone & Marshall, Brown v.
Socialist Workers: Inequality as a Command of the First Amendment, 1983 Sup. CT. REV.
115. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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weight to the fact that, like restrictions on the distribution of leaflets in more traditional fora, the rule would have clear contentdifferential effects. In Greer v. Spock, 118 the Court upheld a regulation prohibiting all political speeches and demonstrations on a military base, without addressing the Third Circuit's contention that
the regulation was hardly neutral in practice, for it prevented exposure only "to the political ideas of those minor candidates whose
campaigns [were] neither prominent enough nor sufficiently wellfinanced to attract media coverage," and who were thus compelled
to "make do with the more old-fashioned face-to-face style of
campaigning."'11 And in PerryEducation Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,18 the Court upheld a board of education policy granting the exclusive bargaining representative for the
district's teachers, but not rival unions, access to the interschool
mail system and teacher mailboxes, despite the contention of the
Court of Appeals and the four dissenting Justices that "the exclusive access policy discriminates on the basis of viewpoint [because]
'the teachers inevitably will receive from [the exclusive bargaining
representative] self-laudatory descriptions ... and will be denied
the critical perspective offered by [the rival unions].' ,"9
The Court's indifference to the de facto content-differential effects of content-neutral restrictions is not limited to restrictions
governing the use of non-public forum public property. United
States v. O'Brien,120 for example, one of the more dramatic mustrations of this indifference, did not involve public property at all.
In O'Brien, the Court upheld a federal statute that prohibited any
person from knowingly destroying a draft card, as applied to an
individual who publicly burned his draft card as a symbolic expression of protest against the war and the draft. As applied to expression, the statute had an obvious disparate impact on those who
opposed government policy, for who would destroy a draft card as
116. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
117. Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1056 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976).
118. 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983).
119. Id. at 965 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt,
652 F.2d 1286, 1296 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983).
120. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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an expression of support for government policy? Thus, in practical
effect, the statute had essentially the same content-differential effect as a law prohibiting any person from destroying a draft card
"as a symbolic expression of protest against government policy."
The Court, however, paid no attention to this aspect of the case.
What conclusions can one draw from the Court's analysis of the
de facto content-differential effects of content-neutral restrictions?
Can one reconcile the cases in which the Court takes account of
these effects with those in which it disregards them? There is, I
think, a revealing basis of reconciliation. In Heffron, Greer, Perry,
O'Brien, and similar cases, 121 alternative means of communication
were readily available to the groups and individuals who were disproportionately disadvantaged by the restrictions. Thus, the effects
of the restrictions were disparate, but not substantial. In the public
forum and disclosure cases,12 however, the restrictions not only
had a disparate impact, they also posed a substantial threat to the
ability of the disproportionately disadvantaged groups and individuals to communicate their ideas effectively. Denial of the opportunity to distribute leaflets in public streets and parks, for example,
could seriously impair the communicative ability of those who do
not have access to more conventional means of communication,
and denial of the opportunity to associate for political purposes
could seriously impair the communicative ability of those who do
not have the resources to communicate effectively on their own. As
the Court has suggested, such restrictions may significantly reduce
"the free circulation of ideas." 2 3 The lesson of these cases, then, is
that the Court considers the de facto content-differential effects of
content-neutral restrictions only when the impact of the restriction

121. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
123. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 103 S. Ct. 416, 423 (1982). Although both the public forum and disclosure cases involve substantial restrictions on the
ability of disproportionately disadvantaged groups and individuals to communicate their
views effectively, the restrictions operate in distinct ways. In the public forum context, all
people are denied the means of communication equally, but the denial matters more to
some speakers than to others because of their greater dependence on the restricted means of
communication. In the disclosure context, all people are subject to disclosure, but only some
speakers are effectively denied the means of communication. This difference may explain
why the Court merely raises the burden of justification in the public forum context, but
actually creates exemptions in the disclosure context.

19831

CONTENT REGULATION

is not only disparate, but substantial. 124

This, then, brings me back to the central inquiry-is the Court's
use of an especially stringent standard of review to test the constitutionality of modest viewpoint-based restrictions explainable on
the ground that such restrictions have content-differential effects?
The preceding analysis would seem to suggest a negative answer,
for the content-differential effects of most modest viewpoint-based
restrictions are no more substantial than the content-differential
effects in Heffron, Perry, Greer, and O'Brien. Since the contentdifferential effects in those cases were not sufficient to trigger a
stringent standard of justification, it would seem to follow that the
arguably analogous content-differential effects of most modest
viewpoint-based restrictions should likewise be insufficient to justify the use of stringent standards of review. The remaining question, of course, is whether the content-differential effects of modest
viewpoint-based restrictions really are analogous to the contentdifferential effects of content-neutral restrictions. For several reasons, the analogy may not hold.
At the outset, it should be noted that the content-differential
effects of most content-neutral restrictions are more erratic, and
thus less specifically viewpoint-based, than the content-differential
effects of most viewpoint-based restrictions. Compare, for example,
a law banning all distributions of leaflets at a state fair with a law
banning all distributions of leaflets by socialists at a state fair. The
content-neutral ban will, of course, have content-differential effects
that disproportionately disadvantage those who would otherwise
employ this means of communication. Moreover, the content-neutral ban will restrict the expression of socialists to the same degree
as the viewpoint-based ban. But the viewpoint-based ban has
greater potential to distort public debate, for it disadvantages only
a single viewpoint whereas the content-neutral ban disadvantages
a range of viewpoints, many of which would no doubt be inconsistent with those of the socialists. Thus, the content-differential effects of even most modest viewpoint-based restrictions are more
likely than the content-differential effects of most content-neutral
restrictions to skew the thought processes of the community in a
specifically viewpoint-based manner. They are thus at least poten124. See generally Stone & Marshall, supra note 114.
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tially more threatening to the interests underlying the first
amendment.1 2 5
Moreover, up to this point, I have simply assumed that viewpoint-based restrictions can be neatly divided into two distinct categories: restrictions that substantially prevent the communication
of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of information, thus significantly distorting public debate; and restrictions that leave speakers
free to express the message with equal effectiveness through alternative means, thus leaving the content of public debate essentially
intac.t. In reality, of course, the distinction is not so neat. At one
extreme, there are viewpoint-based restrictions that prohibit the
communication of a particular message at all times, in all places,
and in all manners. Such restrictions severely distort the thought
processes of the community and are thus, for that reason alone,
presumptively unconstitutional. At the other extreme, there are
viewpoint-based restrictions that prohibit the communication of a
particular message in only a narrowly defined time, place, and
manner, and thus leave available ample alternative channels of
communication. Many viewpoint-based restrictions, however, fall
between these extremes.
In some instances, for example, the restriction may limit only
the time of communication. In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,12 6 the gag order restrained the publication of facts "implicative" of the accused only until a jury was impaneled. In Bridges v.
1 27 the
California,
restriction on comment about judicial proceedings lasted only while the proceedings were pending. And in the
Pentagon Papers Case,128 the injunction against publication presumably would have expired once the Vietnam war ended. If a
sharp line is to be drawn between the two different types of viewpoint-based restrictions, how is that line to be drawn? At what
point does a time limitation change a restriction that substantially
prevents the communication of a particular idea, viewpoint, or
item of information into a mere modest viewpoint-based

125. Moreover, the fact that viewpoint-based restrictions have more consistent and more
predictable viewpoint-differential effects increases the likelihood that they were motivated
by improper considerations. See infra notes 130-48 and accompanying text.
126. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
127. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
128. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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restriction?
In other instances, the restriction may limit only the circumstances of communication. Compare, for example, a law prohibiting
the distribution of leaflets criticizing the war to persons entering
an induction center, with a law prohibiting criticism of the war to
any person known to be considering enlistment, with a law prohibiting criticism of the war. At what point does a modest viewpointbased restriction become a restriction that substantially prevents
the communication of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of
information?
How should we deal with this problem? On the one hand, one
might argue that whatever the difficulties of line-drawing at the
margin, there are some restrictions that clearly fall within the category of modest viewpoint-based restrictions, and so long as we cim
confidently determine that a particular restriction does not substantially prevent the communication of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of information, and thus does not significantly distort public debate, there is no reason to apply stringent standards
of review merely because the restriction has some viewpoint-differential effects.
On the other hand, there is in fact reason to doubt that we can
confidently delineate a category of viewpoint-based restrictions
that do not significantly distort public debate. As history teaches,
judicial evaluations of viewpoint-based restrictions are especially
likely to "become involved with the ideological predispositions of
those doing the evaluating. ' 129 There is a danger, in other words,
that judges and jurors may be influenced by conscious or unconscious biases that may undermine their ability to evaluate accurately and impartially the extent to which particular viewpointbased restrictions actually impair the communication of specific,
often disfavored, messages. Thus, the safest and most sensible
course may be to test all viewpoint-based restrictions by the same
stringent standards of review that we would apply to restrictions
that substantially prevent the communication of particular ideas,
129. J. ELY, supra note 78, at 112. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 70
(1941); J. ELY, supra note 78, at 107-12; L. TB .E,
supra note 5, at 584; Ely, supra note 5, at

1501; Monaghan, FirstAmendment "DueProcess," 83 HAv. L. REv. 518, 529 (1970); Scanlon, supra note 92, at 534-35, 541-42.
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viewpoints, or items of information.
Before we embrace that conclusion, however, we should consider
the risk of judicial misevaluation of the content-differential effects
of content-neutral restrictions. For if the risks in the viewpointbased context are no different than in the content-neutral context,
this consideration may be insufficient to justify the special treatment of viewpoint-based restrictions. In most instances, courts are
less likely to be influenced by impermissible biases in assessing the
constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions than in assessing
the constitutionality of viewpoint-based restrictions, for contentneutral restrictions are not keyed to particular ideas, viewpoints,
or items of information and thus are less likely to trigger either
hostility or favoritism on the part of the trier. But when a contentneutral restriction is challenged on the express ground that it has
impermissible viewpoint-differential effects, the potential for bias
exists and may, indeed, be quite similar to that in the context of
viewpoint-based restrictions. And if the risk of judicial misevaluation is insufficient to trigger stringent standards of review in the
content-neutral context, why should it lead to a different conclusion in the context of viewpoint-based restrictions?
The answer, I think, is that the cost of judicial misevaluation is
less in the content-neutral context. As we have seen, it is quite rare
that a law will survive content-neutral balancing and still have a
disparate and substantial restrictive effect on a particular idea,
viewpoint, or item of information. Indeed, the disclosure and public forum cases may well exhaust the set. Moreover, even in such
cases, the harm is limited, for content-neutral restrictions necessarily limit the availability of only particular means of communciation and thus are unlikely to prevent substantially the communication of a particular message. At worst, as in the public forum and
disclosure cases, they may impose a significant disadvantage on a
particular message in a particular context, but they will not block
the message entirely. Thus, we may be more willing to accept the
risk of judicial misevaluation of the distorting effects of contentneutral restrictions because error is less likely and, when it occurs,
it is less costly.
In sum then, if the content-differential effects of modest viewpoint-based restrictions justify the use of stringent standards of review, it is not because the effects themselves are sufficiently threat-
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ening to warrant such standards, but because it is difficult to
distinguish between modest and dangerous viewpoint-based restrictions, the cost of error is high, and there is reason to doubt the
ability of our legal system objectively and accurately to draw the
line. And although similar problems exist in the content-neutral
context, they do not exist to the same degree.
D. Motivation
A fourth possible explanation for the content-based/contentneutral distinction derives from the notion, apparently embraced
by the Court, that "when regulation is based on the content of
speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to
ensure that communication has not been prohibited 'merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's views.' "130 This concern with ferreting out "improper" motivation reflects a general
shift in constitutional jurisprudence, for although the Warren
Court tended to shy away from motivation as a central feature of
constitutional analysis,"" the Burger Court has tended increasingly
to emphasize motivation as a paramount constitutional concern.132
In the first amendment context, the concept of improper governmental motivation consists chiefly of the precept that the government may not restrict expression simply because it disagrees with
the speaker's views.1 3 This precept has two significant corollaries:
130. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (quoting
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Accord
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981).
131. See, e.g., O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). For a general discussion of
the motivation issue, see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motivation, 1971 Sup. CT. Rnv. 95. See also L. TRE.,supra note
5, at 591-98; Alfange, supra note 5; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YA=E L.J. 1205 (1970); Symposium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN Di.GoL. REv. 925 (1978).
132. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527
(1982); Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
133. See, e.g., Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S.Ct. 948, 960
(1983); Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
872 (1982) (Brennan, J.); id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 553 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 561 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
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the government may not exempt expression from an otherwise general restriction because it agrees with the speaker's views; 4 and
the government may not restrict expression because it might be
embarrassed by publication of the information disclosed. 13 5 This
precept and its corollaries are central to our first amendment jurisprudence, for any effort of government to restrict speech because it
conveys a "false" or "bad" idea is inconsistent with the three basic
first amendment assumptions: in the long run, the best test of
truth is "the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market; 1 3 6 in a self-governing system, the people, not the government "are entrusted with the responsibility for
judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments; 1 37 and, in our constitutional system, the protection of free
expression is designed to enhance personal growth, self-realization,
and the development of individual autonomy.133
To clarify the precise role of improper governmental motivation
in first amendment theory, it may be useful to contrast the improper motive of restricting expression because government disagrees with the speaker's views with the related problem of paternalistic justifications. In examining the communicative impact
concept, we saw that governmental efforts to restrict the expression of particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information because the government does not trust its citizens to make wise or
desirable decisions if they are exposed to such expression are "constitutionally disfavored," and that the government may thus restrict expression for such paternalistic reasons in only the most
compelling of circumstances.1 3 9
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980); id. at 546 (Stevens, J., concurring); First Nat'1 Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978); Linmark
Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976). See also L. TRBE, supra note 5, at 591; Bogen, The Supreme
Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of Freedom of Speech, 35 MD. L. REv. 555, 557
(1976); Stone, supra note 24, at 103-04.
134. See Ely, supra note 5, at 1507.
135. See Blasi, supra note 8.
136. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
137. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978).
138. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). For an
analysis of these basic assumptions, see the authorities cited supra note 8.
139. See supra notes 78-107 and accompanying text.
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Although the improper motivation and paternalistic justification
concepts are in many respects similar, there are important and enlightening differences. First, the improper motivation concept focuses on the government's disagreement with the speaker's views,
whereas the paternalistic justification concept focuses on the government's concern with the consequences that might result if
others accept the speaker's views. In many instances, both concerns will be present. For example, if the government restricts expression advocating that one's moral duty is to refuse induction
into the army, the government may have both an improper motive-a desire to suppress the "bad" idea that people have a moral
duty to refuse induction-and a paternalistic justification-concern that people will be persuaded to refuse induction. In
other instances, only one of the concerns may be present. For example, if the government restricts expression deploring the brutality of war because such speech might cause people to refuse induction,
the
government
will have
a paternalistic
justification-concern that people will be induced to refuse induction-but not necessarily an improper motive-it may agree that
war is deplorably brutal. Alternatively, if the government refuses
to employ in its defense plants people who oppose the war, it may
have an improper motivation-a desire to suppress the "bad" idea
that the war is unjust-but a nonpaternalistic justification. Moreover, as this last example illustrates, the concept of improper motivation is wholly independent of communicative impact, for there
may be an improper motivation whether or not the restriction involves communicative impact.
Second, although paternalistic justifications are constitutionally
disfavored, they are not per se illegitimate. In compelling circumstances, as where there is a clear and present danger of some serious evil, a paternalistic justification may be sufficient to sustain a
restriction on expression. 140 An improper motivation, however, is
by definition per se illegitimate. The government can never justify
a restriction on otherwise protected expression merely because it
disagrees with the speaker's views. 4 1
140. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919).
141. Some special circumstances may arise, however, in which the government may act
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Third, although the paternalistic justification concept ordinarily
precludes the government from justifying content-based restrictions on paternalistic grounds, the existence of a possible paternalistic justification does not preclude the government from justifying
such restrictions on alternative, nonpaternalistic grounds. The existence of a possible paternalistic justification, in other words, does
not taint the restriction. The improper motivation concept, however, clearly operates as a taint. That is, if an improper motivation
played a substantial role in the government's decision to restrict
expression,14 2 the restriction must be invalidated even if alternative, proper justifications are available. The improper motivation
concept thus demands an effort to ferret out improper motivations
and to eliminate their impact on governmental decisions to restrict
expression.143
The problem, of course, is to devise some effective means to ferret out these improper motivations. It is at this point that the content-based/content-neutral distinction enters the picture, for the
probability that an improper motivation has tainted a decision to
restrict expression is far greater when the restriction is directed at
a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of information than when it is
content-neutral. Indeed, in the content-neutral context the risk of
improper motivation is quite low, for such restrictions necessarily
apply to'all ideas, viewpoints, and items of information, and are
thus unlikely to reflect a specific intent on the part of those who
adopted the restriction to suppress any particular message. In such
circumstances, it seems sensible to presume the absence of improper motivation and to put the burden of proving such a motiva-

for reasons closely related to disagreement with a speaker's views. A President, for example,
need not appoint a Secretary of State with whom he disagrees. See Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507 (1980).
142. See Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
143. This ferreting out of improper motivation is an essential component of motivational
analysis. See J. ELY, supra note 78, at 136-45; Stone, supra note 24, at 103-07. Another
possible justification for the distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions should be distinguished from the concern with improper motivation. Because contentneutral restrictions limit all speakers, there are built-in safeguards that help to ensure that
the restrictions actually further the asserted purposes; because content-based restrictions
limit only some speakers, on the other hand, there is less assurance that the restrictions
actually further the asserted purposes. This rationale applies to all restrictions that do not
restrict all speakers, regardless of whether the line is drawn in terms of content.
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tion on the party challenging the restriction on motivational
grounds.""'
When a restriction is directed at a particular idea, viewpoint, or
item of information, however, the risk of improper motivation is
quite high, for government officials considering the adoption of
such a restriction will almost invariably have their own opinions
about the merits of the restricted speech and there is thus a substantial risk that, in deciding whether to adopt the restriction, they
will be affected, either consciously or unconsciously, by an improper motive. The officials, in other words, may be more inclined
to adopt the restriction, and to pursue the competing governmental interest at the expense of "free speech," when they disapprove,
rather than approve, of the ideas expressed.1" 5 In such circumstances, the most sensible course might be simply to presume improper motivation and to put the burden of proving the absence of
improper motivation on the government. The government could
meet this burden by proving, for example, that the challenged restriction was the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling
governmental interest, for such proof would effectively demonstrate that the government would have *adopted the restriction
even in the absence of improper motivation. 14 Thus, the need to
ferret out improper motivations may help to explain both the content-based/content-neutral distinction and the Court's use of stringent standards of review to test the constitutionality of even modest viewpoint-based restrictions.
But is all this really persuasive? Can the concern with improper
motivation fairly support the doctrinal structure? After all, even
proof of an actual improper motive requires the invalidation of an
otherwise constitutional restriction; the need to guard against the
mere possibility of improper motivation does not necessarily justify
the invalidation of all viewpoint-based restrictions that are not demonstrably necessary to further compelling governmental interests. Although such a standard may ensure that the government
144. On the difficulties of proving motivation, see L. TRInE, supra note 5, at 594-98; Brest,
supra note 131; Ely, supra note 131; Symposium, supra note 131.
145. See Stone, supra note 24, at 105-06.

146. See Clark, Legislative Motivation and FundamentalRights in ConstitutionalLaw,
15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 953, 990-96 (1978); Stone, supra note 24, at 104-09; see also J. ELY,

supra note 78, at 145-48; Symposium, supra note 131.
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would-have adopted the viewpoint-based restrictions even in the
absence of improper motivation, this standard also has substantial
costs, for it would invalidate not only viewpoint-based restrictions
that were in fact improperly motivated, but also those viewpointbased restrictions that further significant governmental interests,
and that the government might reasonably have adopted even in
the absence of improper motivation. One might question, then,
whether the need to assure motivational purity is sufficiently
weighty to justify so substantial a sacrifice of legitimate governmental interests. Indeed, one might argue that a more sensible approach would be to presume proper motivation, in the absence of
specific proof to the contrary, whenever a viewpoint-based restriction reasonably furthers a significant governmental interest.
The answer, I think, is that the critical motivational inquiry is
not whether the government officials would have adopted the restriction even if they did not disfavor the restricted speech, but
whether they would have adopted it even if it had been directed at
speech that they themselves supported. The concern, in other
words, is not only that government officials should not affirmatively attempt to suppress ideas with which they disagree, but also
that they should act in an even-handed manner and thus treat disfavored ideas with the same respect they would accord to the ideas
that they support. Viewed in this light, the more stringent standard of review seems sensible, for government officials are unlikely
to disadvantage the ideas that they themselves support except in
the most compelling circumstances.
Another aspect of the improper motivation issue lends further
support to the content-based/content-neutral distinction. For just
as there is a danger of improper motivation in the formulation and
adoption of viewpoint-based restrictions in the legislative and administrative processes, so too is there a danger of improper motivation in the interpretation and application of such restrictions in
the judicial process. Indeed, as noted earlier,147 ideological predispositions may influence judges and jurors called upon to implement content-based restrictions directed at specific ideas, viewpoints, or items of information. To minimize the impact of such
biases, and to protect against potential manipulation of the judicial
147. See supra notes 108-29 and accompanying text.
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process, it may be sensible to test such restrictions with especially
stringent standards of review, thus leaving little room for ideological distortion.14 8
Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, do not pose
these dangers to the same degree. There is, of course, a risk of distortion whenever judges and jurors are called upon to determine,
as a matter of fact, whether a particular speaker actually violated a
restriction on expression, for the biases of the fact finder inherently threaten the integrity of the fact finding process. But there is
likely to be relatively little distortion in the more fundamental determination of whether the content-neutral restriction is itself constitutional, for this determination will necessarily affect, not only
the particular speaker involved in the litigation, but other speakers
as well, regardless of their viewpoint or message. The very breadth
of application of the determination will thus tend to reduce the
incentive for manipulation.
In light of these four considerations-equality, communicative
impact, distortion, and motivation-there is, I think, a sound basis
for the Court's content-based/content-neutral distinction and for
its use of especially stringent standards of review to test the constitutionality of even modest viewpoint-based restrictions. Although
particular content-neutral restrictions may limit as much or even
more total expression than particular viewpoint-based restrictions,
the latter pose special, quite distinct dangers to the system of free
expression. And although no one of these four considerations may
independently explain the distinction in its entirety, in combination they both explain and justify the Court's heightened scrutiny
of viewpoint-based restrictions.
V. AMBIGUOUS RESTRICTIONS: CONTENT-NEUTRAL OR VIEWPOINTBASED?
This does not end our inquiry, however, for up to this point, I
have focused on only those content-based restrictions that are directed at the communication of particular ideas, viewpoints, or
148. See J. ELY, supra note 78, at 107-112; L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 583-84; Ely, supra
note 5, at 1501; Farber, supra note 3, at 749; Monaghan, supra note 129, at 529; Scanlon,
supra note 92, at 534-35; Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70
CALIF. L. Rav. 107, 109 (1982).
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items of information. As we have seen, there are sensible reasons
for distinguishing such viewpoint-based restrictions from contentneutral restrictions and for testing such viewpoint-based restrictions by especially stringent standards of review. In this Part, I
shall consider four types of restrictions that cannot clearly be characterized as either content-neutral or viewpoint-based: restrictions
that are content-neutral on their face, but are justified in terms of
communicative impact; restrictions that are directed at a particular subject-matter; restrictions that are directed at the use of profanity, nudity, or other arguably viewpoint-neutral forms of "content"; and "speaker-based" restrictions.
A. Content-Neutral Restrictions That Turn On Communicative
Impact
In most instances, the government defends content-neutral restrictions in terms that are unrelated to the communicative impact
of the particular ideas expressed. For example, the government
might defend a restriction on the distribution of leaflets on the
ground that such distribution produces litter; it might defend a restriction on loudspeakers on the ground that loudspeakers create
noise; and it might defend a restriction on parades on the ground
that parades obstruct traffic. In some instances, however, the government defends content-neutral restrictions in terms of communicative impact. To what extent, if any, should the Court treat such
restrictions as content-based? There are several variations.
First, suppose that, to protect its citizens against unwanted exposure to "offensive" messages, the government bans all billboards.14 In effect, the government argues that billboards are especially obtrusive and that it should be permitted to protect the
interests of the "captive audience" in this situation so long as it
acts in a content-neutral manner. 150 Because this restriction is
facially content-neutral, it would not seem to pose appreciably
greater risks of inequality, distortion, or improper motivation than
other content-neutral restrictions. 51 But the restriction is designed
149. Cf. Farber, supra note 3, at 745-47.
150. On the captive audience, see Stone, supra note 5, at 262-80.
151. A slightly greater risk of improper motivation may exist in this context than in the
context of other facially content-neutral restrictions because the government's attention is
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to limit expression because ideas may be offensive and, as we have
seen, such intolerance-based justifications for restricting expression
are constitutionally disfavored and, hence, presumptively invalid.152 How, then, should we analyze this restriction-by contentneutral balancing, the more stringent standards of content-based
review, or some other standard?
At the outset, it should be noted that, for the reasons discussed
earlier,15 3 any effort of the government to defend a restriction on

expression in terms of a constitutionally disfavored justification
automatically triggers a stringent standard of review, and this is so
even in the absence of any concern about equality, distortion, or
motivation. It is not clear, however, that this situation implicates a
constitutionally disfavored justification, for the government's interest in protecting its citizens against exposure to offensive messages
does not seem as threatening to first amendment concerns when
government restricts all messages equally as when it restricts only
those messages that give the greatest "offense." Indeed, the censorial and "heckler's veto" aspects of intolerance-based justifications
seem much reduced when the government attempts to protect this
interest in a content-neutral manner.
This suggests, then, that this type of restriction should be tested
by less stringent standards than viewpoint-based restrictions, such
as, for example, a law banning only Nazi messages from billboards,
but perhaps by more stringent standards than content-neutral restrictions that are defended on grounds unrelated to communicative impact. Indeed, the Court appears to have embraced precisely
this analysis, for the Court has held that the "ability of government.

. .

to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hear-

ing it," even in the form of a viewpoint-neutral restriction, is "dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are
being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner,"1 a standard
directed specifically to offensiveness. The government thus may be more aware of the type
of speech likely to be affected by the restriction on billboards.
152. See supra notes 78-107 and accompanying text.
153. Id.
154. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). Accord Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
209-10 (1975); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). See generally Stone, supra note
5, at 262-80.
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that falls somewhere between content-neutral balancing and the
more demanding standards of content-based review.
A second variation on the communicative impact issue is illustrated by a law prohibiting the display of any message on any billboard if a specified number of individuals complain that the message offends them. In defense of this law, the government might
argue that the restriction is analytically similar to the first variation, for like the first variation, this law turns on communicative
impact, but is clearly content-neutral on its face. Moreover, the
government might argue that, because this law defines prohibited
expression entirely in terms of prohibited effects, and does not single-out any particular message for restriction, there is less likelihood of improper governmental motivation than when a law is expressly viewpoint-based. Thus, this law, like the first variation,
should arguably be governed by an intermediate standard of
review.
The analogy, however, is unpersuasive, for this type of restriction is significantly more threatening to first amendment interests
than the first variation. This is so for several reasons. First, unlike
the first variation, this law does not restrict all messages. Rather,
although the law is neutral on its face, it restricts, and is intended
to restrict, only some messages. This type of restriction, therefore,
implicates equality and distortion concerns to a greater degree
than the first variation. Moreover, the content-differential effects
of the second variation are quite different from the de facto content-differential effects usually associated with content-neutral restrictions. In most content-neutral situations, the content-differential effects are incidental. They occur because the restriction
disproportionately disadvantages those speakers who would otherwise disproportionately use the restricted means of expression.
Here, however, the content-differential effects are anticipated and
more severe, for this type of restriction, like most viewpoint-based
restrictions, prohibits some speakers from using the restricted
means of expression while permitting others to do so.
Second, although the risk of improper motivation may be less
here than when a restriction is viewpoint-based, there is a greater
risk of improper motivation in this context than in either the first
variation or the more usual content-neutral situation. This is so
because government officials in this context know that the restric-
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tion will limit only some messages-most likely only those
messages that are most offensive or controversial. Thus, official
hostility to, or lack of sympathy for, speech is more likely in this
context than in the more conventional content-neutral context.
Finally, restrictions of this type involve a more troublesome form
of intolerance-based justification than the first variation, for restrictions of this second type enable individuals effectively to suppress those views with which they disagree without limiting the
ideas they support. In practical effect, this type of restriction simply delegates to private citizens the power to "enact" what amount
in operation to viewpoint-based restrictions. The censorial and
heckler's veto concerns in this context are thus virtually identical
to the concerns that render intolerance-based justifications constitutionally disfavored in the context of restrictions that are expressly viewpoint-based.
For these reasons, then, the second variation has much in common with viewpoint-based restrictions, and is clearly more threatening than the first variation to the interests underlying the content-based/content-neutral distinction. Restrictions of this type
should thus be governed by content-based standards of review. 55
A third variation on the communicative impact issue is illustrated by the problem of the hostile audience. Suppose, for example, that a soapbox orator's speech triggers a hostile audience response and that the orator thereafter is charged with provoking a
breach of the peace. Breach of the peace statutes do not usually
single-out particular messages for restriction. Rather, such laws
usually define prohibited speech in terms of prohibited effects.
They are facially content-neutral. One might think, therefore, that
such laws should be treated no differently than any other contentneutral law that regulates the time, place, and manner of expression. Such laws turn in application on communicative impact, however, and are closely analogous to the second variation. Indeed, like
the second variation, breach of the peace statutes have distinct
viewpoint-differential effects, raise serious concerns about govern155. This proposition should not apply, however, when the government individuates the
decision whether to receive the communication-that is, when the government enables individuals who do not wish to receive the communication to avoid exposure without interfering
with the right of individuals who wish to receive the communication to do so. See Stone,
supra note 5, at 262-66.
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mental motivation, and are defended in terms of a clearly intolerance-based justification.
There is, however, at least one difference between the second
and third variations. In the second variation, opposition to a particular message results in continued restriction, whereas in the
third variation, opposition results in restriction only at the particular time and place of opposition. That is, in the second variation,
the law bans future expression once a threshold of past opposition
has been attained; in the third variation, the law bans future expression only when the expression may trigger a further breach of
the peace. The third variation would thus seem to have a less severe suppressive effect. This distinction, however, is more apparent
than real, for unless stringent standards of review are applied to
the third variation, the mere possibility of opposition might be sufficient to restrict even future expression, thus merging the second
and third variations. In any event, this difference, although perhaps relevant to the degree of potential distortion of public debate,
does not affect the motivational and intolerance-based concerns.
Thus, although the hostile audience issue may not pose all the
problems of expressly viewpoint-based restrictions, the concerns
are quite similar, and the hostile audience issue, like the second
variation, should be governed by the standards of content-based
review.

156

As a final variation, suppose the managers of a state fair enact a
rule prohibiting all peripatetic distributions of leaflets on the
grounds of the fair, and a court upholds the rule as a reasonable
content-neutral restriction designed to prevent interference with
the movement of persons within the fair. 157 Suppose also, however,

that an extreme political group can prove that it was the only
group engaged in peripatetic distribution of leaflets on a regular
156. The Court essentially has adopted this position. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); cf. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315 (1951). See also Ely, supra note 5, at 1500; Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech
Under the First Amendment, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 29, 53-54 (1973). Similarly, a law prohibiting any person from making a speech that might persuade others to commit unlawful acts
should be deemed content-based even though it is content-neutral on its face. Another problem, related to the hostile audience problem, involves governmental efforts to grant special
benefits or exemptions to speakers whose ideas might trigger a hostile response. See Stone &
Marshall, supra note 114.
157. Cf. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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basis prior to the enactment of the rule, and that the managers
adopted the rule in substantial part because of their hostility to
the group's views. In such circumstances, the rule presumably
would be invalidated as the product of improper motivation. 158
Suppose now, however, that the group can prove that the managers were affected not by a personal desire to suppress the group's
views, but by a flood of complaints from fairgoers who were "offended" by the group's leaflets. How should we deal with this situation? Because we are concerned here with a disfavored justification rather than an improper motivation, at least three resolutions
exist. First, we might treat the rule as viewpoint-based. Second, we
might treat the rule like the first variation, and test it by an intermediate standard because, like the first variation, it restricts all
messages without regard to the communicative impact of any particular message. And third, we might treat the rule as contentneutral.
The answer, I think, lies in the notion, explored earlier," 9 that a
critical factor differentiating an improper motive from a disfavored
justification is that the presence of the former requires automatic
invalidation, whereas the presence of the latter does not affect the
analysis if alternative, nondisfavored justifications are available.
Here, the rule is defended as a reasonable means of protecting the
free movement of people within the fair, as well as on the ground
that it protects fairgoers from offensive messages. Because the free
movement rationale is an available, nondisfavored justification, the
rule should be analyzed as an ordinary content-neutral restriction.
The existence of an alternative, disfavored justification does not
affect the analysis.
B. Subject-Matter Restrictions
The second type of restriction that does not fit neatly within the
Court's content-based/content-neutral distinction consists of subject-matter restrictions. Such restrictions are directed, not at particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information, but at entire subjects of expression. Police Department v. Mosley,260 for example,
158. See supra notes 130-48 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
160. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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concerned the constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance that prohibited picketing near a school building, but that expressly exempted peaceful labor picketing. Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights'61 concerned the constitutionality of a city policy that permitted individuals to lease the interior advertising spaces of city
transit vehicles for the display of commercial, but not public issues
or political, messages. ConsolidatedEdison Co. v. Public Services
Commission'" concerned the constitutionality of a Commission order prohibiting public utility companies from including in their
monthly bills inserts addressing controversial issues of public policy. Greer v. Spock6 5 concerned the constitutionality of a policy of
the Fort Dix Military Reservation permitting civilian speakers to
address military personnel on subjects ranging from business management to drug abuse, but prohibiting any speech or demonstration of a partisan political nature. Widmar v. Vincent'6 concerned
the constitutionality of a state university policy making university
facilities available for the activities of student groups, but expressly prohibiting religious activities. And Young v. American
65
Mini Theatres1
concerned the constitutionality of a Detroit zoning ordinance that required the dispersion of motion picture theaters exhibiting nonobscene but sexually explicit movies. 66
The subject-matter issue has baffled the Court.16 7 In Mosley,
ConsolidatedEdison, and Widmar, the Court treated subject-matter restrictions as essentially viewpoint-based, and tested the restrictions by the stringent standards of content-based review. 6 8 In
Lehman, Greer, and Young, the Court treated subject-matter restrictions as essentially content-neutral, and tested them by the

161. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
162. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
163. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
164. 454 U.S. 263 (1982).
165. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
166. See also CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94 (1973).
167. See Stephan, supra note 1; Stone, supra note 24.
168. See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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more flexible standards of content-neutral balancing. 169
The Court has failed to address this inconsistency in its analysis.
It has suggested, for example, that subject-matter restrictions must
be tested by stringent standards of review when they limit expression in a public forum,

170

but it has not explained why the nature

of the public property should control the content-based/contentneutral distinction when subject-matter, but not viewpoint-based,
restrictions are at issue. Similarly, in finding that the government
has created a public forum, the Court sometimes has relied on the
fact that the government has voluntarily permitted the discussion
of certain subjects71 1 but in other cases it has failed, without expla-

nation, to apply the same principle. 2 And in its analysis of subject-matter restrictions that do not involve173 public property, the
Court's distinctions remain wholly obscure.

The confusion generated by subject-matter restrictions is hardly
surprising, for such restrictions fall between viewpoint-based and
content-neutral restrictions, sharing some of the characteristics of
each. 17 4 On the one hand, subject-matter restrictions are directed,
not at particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information, but at
entire subjects of expression. They are thus less likely than viewpoint-based restrictions to distort public debate in a viewpoint-differential manner, to implicate constitutionally disfavored justifications, or to be the product of improper motivation. On the other
hand, subject-matter restrictions are expressly directed at particu-

169. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
170. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct 948, 955
(1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-40 (1980); Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
171. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 460-61 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972).
172. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973).
173. Compare Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976); and Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), with Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978); and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
174. See Farber, supra note 3, at 735; Schauer, supra note 13, at 283-85; Stone, supra
note 24, at 108-15.
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lar subjects. They are thus narrower than content-neutral restrictions, and more likely than content-neutral restrictions to threaten
the concerns underlying the content-based/content-neutral
distinction.
The problem, then, is how to characterize subject-matter restrictions. Are they content-based, or content-neutral? There are several possibilities. First, if we find that the content-neutral characteristics predominate, we might classify such restrictions as
content-neutral and test them by the ordinary standards of content-neutral balancing. Second, if we find that the content-based
characteristics predominate, we might classify such restrictions as
content-based and test them by the more stringent standards of
content-based review. 1' Third, we might conclude that subjectmatter restrictions constitute a distinct and independent category,
and test them by some intermediate standard of review. 17 6 Fourth,

we might test subject-matter restrictions by different standards of
review, depending upon the context in which the issue arises. 177 Finally, as I have argued elsewhere,1 s we might distinguish between

different types of subject-matter restrictions, depending upon the
extent to which they implicate the concerns underlying the content-based/content-neutral distinction, treating some subject-matter restrictions as content-based and others as content-neutral.179
C. Profanity
The third type of restriction that does not fit neatly within the
Court's content-based/content-neutral distinction concerns restrictions on the use of profanity. The profanity issue, like the subjectmatter issue, has generated much conflict and confusion among
Justices and commentators alike. The Court first directly consid175. See Schauer, supra note 13, at 284-85; The Supreme Court, supra note 78, at 238-39
& n.42.
176. See Farber, supra note 3, at 729-30.
177. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-40 (1980).
178. See Stone, supra note 24, at 108-15.
179. Regardless of the approach adopted for subject-matter restrictions generally, any law
that substantially prevents speech about a particular subject should be presumptively invalid because such a law would seriously distort public debate and reinforce the status quo.
The cases, to date, have involved only modest subject-matter restrictions.
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ered the profanity issue in Cohen v. California.8 " In Cohen, the
defendant was convicted of disturbing the peace for wearing a
jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." The Court, in an eloquent opinion by Justice Harlan, reversed the conviction. Harlan
emphasized that the use of profanity may be an extremely effective
means for individuals to convey otherwise inexpressible emotions-emotions that may be as important a part of communication as the cognitive ideas themselves.18 1
Several years later, however, in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica,8 2 the Court sustained the constitutionality of
a rule prohibiting broadcasters from airing "patently offensive"
language when children might be listening. The Court assumed
that the challenged order was content-based, but divided sharply
over whether profanity, like obscenity, was of only low first amendment value, and thus entitled to only limited constitutional
protection. 183
This formulation of the issue misses the point. Although restrictions on the use of profanity are content-based in the most literal
sense, such restrictions do not pose the dangers that underlie the
Court's use of stringent standards of review to test the constitutionality of content-based restrictions. Restrictions on the use of
profanity might thus more sensibly be analogized to content-neutral restrictions on the manner of expression than to viewpointbased restrictions on the substantive content of expression.
It is true, of course, that restrictions on the use of profanity may
affect some speakers more than others and thus may have de facto
viewpoint-differential effects.2" But, as we have seen, this is also
true of most content-neutral restrictions. 85 And restrictions on the
use of profanity are no more likely to significantly distort public
debate in a viewpoint-differential manner than other content-neu-

180. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942).
181. 403 U.S. at 26.
182. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
183. Id. at 744-48; id. at 761-62 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
184. Indeed, Justice Harlan expressed this concern in Cohen. See 403 U.S. at 26. See also
Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 153,
189 (1972).
185. See supra notes 108-29 and accompanying text.
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tral restrictions.
Moreover, although restrictions on the use of profanity are often
defended on the ground that profane speech is offensive, not all
governmental efforts to restrict expression because it is offensive
are constitutionally disfavored. Governmental efforts to limit
speech because it is offensively noisy, for example, do not implicate the same kind of censorial or heckler's veto concerns as governmental efforts to limit speech because the ideas are offensive.
Analytically, offense at language is more like offense at noise than
offense at ideas. 8 6 And restrictions on the use of profanity are no
more likely to involve improper governmental motivation, in the
form of official disapproval of ideas, than most content-neutral restrictions. Thus, although restrictions on offensive language may
seem at first glance to be content-based, they are more appropriately analyzed as content-neutral.
This conclusion does not suggest that it is now open season on
profanity. To the contrary, the concerns that shaped Justice
Harlan's opinion in Cohen remain equally relevant to content-neutral balancing. The use of profanity, as Harlan recognized, is often
an effective means for individuals to convey dramatically otherwise
inexpressible emotions, and any effort of government to limit the
use of this means of expression should be tested by a relatively
demanding standard of justification. Content-neutral balancing,
fairly applied, demands no less.
D. Speaker-Based Restrictions
The fourth type of restriction that does not fit neatly within the
Court's content-based/content-neutral distinction consists of
speaker-based restrictions. Such restrictions treat some speakers
differently than others, but define the distinction in terms other
than content. In FirstNational Bank v. Bellotti'8 7 for example, a
state statute prohibited business corporations, but not other
speakers, from expending funds to affect the vote in particular

186. Thus, although restrictions on profanity turn on communicative impact, see Ely,
supra note 5, at 1498, they are not content-based. Cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 103 S.
Ct. 2875, 2889 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 546-48 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
187. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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types of referenda. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Commission,'88 a Commission order prohibited public utility companies, but not other speakers, from inserting certain types of communications in their bills. And in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,'89 a municipal ordinance
prohibited charitable organizations that did not use at least seventy-five percent of their receipts for "charitable purposes," but
not other organizations, from soliciting contributions from the
public by certain means. To what extent, if any, should such
speakdr-based inequalities affect constitutional analysis?
Although, as these cases suggest, speaker-based restrictions are
not uncommon, the Court has given the issue scant attention. In
Bellotti, ConsolidatedEdison, and Schaumburg, the Court invalidated the challenged restrictions without addressing the speakerbased inequalities. Recently, however, in Regan v. Taxation With
Representation" and Perry Education Association v. PerryLocal
Educators' Association,91 the Court squarely confronted the issue.
In Taxation With Representation, the Court unanimously sustained the constitutionality of a federal statute providing that contributions to an otherwise tax exempt organization, other than a
tax exempt veterans' organization, may not be deducted on the
contributor's income tax return if a substantial part of the organization's activities consist of attempts to influence legislation. At
the outset, the Court made clear that "Congress is not required by
the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying. 192 The Court then
turned to the speaker-based distinction between veterans' and
other organizations. The Court examined the question as an equal
protection issue and noted that, as a general rule, "statutory classifications are valid if they bear a rational relation to a legitimate
governmental purpose."1 93 Although recognizing that statutes may
be "subjected to a higher level of scrutiny if they interfere with the
exercise of a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech," 194 the

188. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
189. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
190. 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983).
191. 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983).
192. 103 S. Ct. at 2001.
193. Id. at 2001-02.
194. Id. at 2002.
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Court explained that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and
thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.1195 The Court emphasized

that "[tihe case would be different if Congress were to discriminate
invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to '[aim] at the suppression of dangerous ideas,'

",19

but concluded that, under the

challenged provisions, veterans' organizations were "entitled to
re97
ceive tax-deductible contributions regardless of the content"' of
their speech.
In Perry, the Court narrowly sustained the constitutionality of a
collective bargaining agreement between a local board of education
and the duly elected exclusive bargaining representative for the
teachers. The agreement provided that the exclusive bargaining
representative, but no other union, would have access to the interschool mail system. Noting that the policy applied "to all unions
other than the recognized bargaining representative," and finding
"no indication in the record that the policy was motivated by a
desire to suppress" the views of rival unions, the Court concluded
that the policy did not constitute "viewpoint discrimination barred
by the First Amendment."'' 98 Moreover, after explaining that the
interschool mail system was not a public forum, the Court analogized speaker-based restrictions to subject-matter restrictions and
declared that although speaker-based restrictions "may be impermissible in a public forum,"'199 they are permissible in a nonpublic
forum if "they are reasonable in light of the purpose which the
forum at issue serves.

' 200

The Court held that that standard was

readily satisfied in Perry in light of "the special responsibilities of
an exclusive bargaining representative."2011 Finally, on the equal
protection issue, the Court concluded that because the rival unions
"did not have a First Amendment or other right of access to the
interschool mail system," the grant of access to the exclusive bargaining representative did not burden any fundamental right of
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 2003.
Id. at 2002 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
103 S. Ct. at 2002.
103 S. Ct. at 957 n.9.
Id. at 957.

200. Id.
201. Id. at 960.
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the rival unions, and the decision to grant access to the exclusive
bargaining representative "need not be tested by the strict scrutiny
applied when government action impinges upon a fundamental
2 02

right."

In these cases, then, the Court sharply distinguished speakerbased from viewpoint-based restrictions and, at least in the subsidy and nonpublic forum contexts, 0 3 tested speaker-based restrictions by a standard of reasonableness. Is this approach defensible?
There are at least two perspectives from which we might approach
the question.
First, there is the perspective of equality. Assuming that
speaker-based restrictions are merely a variant of content-neutral
restrictions, to what extent, if any, does the first amendment or
equal protection clause require that speaker-based restrictions be
tested by more stringent standards than other content-neutral restrictions because speaker-based restrictions involve express inequalities? Assuming that speaker-based inequalities are contentneutral, it is not clear to me that such restrictions implicate the
concerns and values underlying the first amendment more seriously than other content-neutral restrictions. 2 Under the equal
202. Id. at 959-60.
203. The speaker-based issue may arise, not only in the subsidy and nonpublic forum
contexts, but in other contexts as well. Schaumburg involved a speaker-based restriction in
a public forum, for example, and Bellotti and ConsolidatedEdison involved speaker-based
restrictions that were wholly unrelated to the use of public property. Moreover, in some
instances, as in Taxation With Representation and Perry, the speaker-based restrictions
may take the form of special exemptions from otherwise constitutional content-neutral restrictions; in other instances, as in Schaumburg, speaker-based restrictions may take the
form of special limitations on particular speakers where broader, nonspeaker-based restrictions would be invalid. Thus, in Taxation With Representationand Perry, the government
was under no duty to grant anyone a subsidy or access to the mail system, but chose voluntarily to create the inequality by establishing special preferences for selected speakers. In
Schaumburg, on the other hand, a complete ban on solicitation in public places clearly
would be unconstitutional, but the Schaumburg ordinance attempted to define a class of
speakers who, because of their special characteristics, arguably should be subject to special
restrictions.
204. Speaker-based inequalities, however, are not irrelevant to first amendment analysis.
Rather, even if such inequalities are treated as content-neutral, they may affect the outcome
of content-neutral balancing. In some cases, the very existence of the inequality may undermine the asserted justification for the restriction. Suppose, for example, that the government may constitutionally ban all peripatetic distribution of leaflets on the grounds of a
state fair because the government has a substantial interest in maintaining the orderly
movement of people within the fair and there are adequate alternative means of communi-
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protection clause, however, the inequalities may assume added significance, for as the Court has recognized, the concerns and values
underlying the equal protection clause are especially implicated by
inequalities that burden "the exercise of a fundamental right, such
as freedom of speech. ' 20 5 The problem, then, is to define the circumstances in which the equal protection clause requires invalidation of a law that burdens free speech but does not independently
violate the first amendment.
The Court has not come to grips with this problem. In Perry,for
example, the Court stated that because the rival unions had no
first amendment right of access to the interschool mail system, the
speaker-based restriction did not burden a fundamental right.0
That formulation reads the fundamental rights doctrine out of our
jurisprudence. To make sense of the doctrine, the Court must offer
some formulation that recognizes three categories of inequalities:
inequalities that violate the first amendment; inequalities that do
not violate the first amendment but sufficiently burden free speech
to trigger fundamental rights analysis under the equal protection
clause; and inequalities that neither violate the first amendment
nor sufficiently burden free speech to trigger fundamental rights
analysis. 0 7 That task, which raises central questions of equal protection jurisprudence, is beyond the scope of this paper.
The second perspective from which one might approach speakerbased restrictions turns on the content-based/content-neutral distinction. Up to this point, I have assumed that speaker-based restrictions are content-neutral. It may not be that simple. Although

cation. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
Suppose now, however, that the government exempts veterans from this restriction. Even if
we treat this speaker-based restriction as content-neutral, the very fact of the exemption
undermines the substantiality of the government's asserted interest in crowd control, and
casts doubt on the constitutionality of the restriction on nonveteran leaflet distribution even
under the same standard of review that was used to uphold the nonspeaker-based restriction on all distribution. For a general discussion of the relationship between equality and
free expression, see Karst, supra note 47.
205. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2002 (1983).
206. See 103 S. Ct. at 959.
207. This problem is not unique to the first amendment, but exists whenever the Constitution protects a fundamental right. According to the Court, to be "fundamental," a right
must be "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). The problem thus goes to the very core
of the doctrine.
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speaker-based restrictions are facially content-neutral, there is
often a close correlation between speaker identity and viewpoint,
and speaker-based restrictions thus may have clear viewpoint-differential effects. In Taxation With Representation, for example,
the challenged policy unquestionably favored some viewpoints over
others, for veterans' organizations often take consistent and predictable positions on particular issues. Similarly, in Perry, as the
four dissenting Justices noted, the challenged policy favored "'a
particular viewpoint on labor relations in the Perry schools, [for]
the teachers inevitably will receive from [the exclusive bargaining
representative] self-laudatory descriptions of its activities [and]
will be denied the critical perspective offered by [rival unions].' ",208
Indeed, in some instances speaker-based restrictions may correlate
almost perfectly with viewpoint. Consider, for example, laws
prohibiting members of the Communist Party from working in defense plants or denying tax deductions to individuals who contribute to the Nazi Party.2 0 9
It is true, of course, that content-neutral restrictions that are not
speaker-based also have de facto viewpoint-differential effects and,
as we have seen, the Court generally disregards such effects unless
they substantially distort public debate. 210 The de facto viewpoint
differential effects of speaker-based restrictions, however, are often
more specific and more direct than the effects of other contentneutral restrictions. They thus may be more analogous to the viewpoint-differential effects of modest viewpoint-based restrictions. 211
Moreover, speaker-based restrictions are often more likely than
other content-neutral restrictions to be the product of improper
motivation, for the more predictable the de facto viewpoint-differential effects, the greater the likelihood that those effects were
intended.
The hybrid nature of speaker-based restrictions is evident in the
Court's decisions. In Anderson v. Celebrezze,1 2 for example, the

208. 103 S. Ct. at 965 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v.
Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1296 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983)).
209. See Stone & Marshall, supra note 114.
210. See supra notes 108-29 and accompanying text.
211. See id.
212. 103 S. Ct. 1564 (1983).
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Court held that a special filing deadline for independent candidates violated the first amendment. The Court emphasized that
"[b]y limiting the opportunities of independent-minded voters...
such restrictions threaten to reduce diversity and competition in
the marketplace of ideas [and discriminate against] those voters
whose political preferences lie outside the existing political parties."21 Applying a general balancing test, the Court observed that
"it is especially difficult for the State to justify a restriction that
limits political participation by an identifiable political group
whose members share a particular viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status. '214 Moreover, in Perry, the four dissenting Justices, emphasizing the specificity of the viewpoint-differential effects, argued that the speaker-based restriction should be
characterized as viewpoint-based. 2 5 Although the majority rejected
this characterization, they expressly analogized speaker-based restrictions to subject-matter restrictions and suggested that, in the
public forum context, speaker-based restrictions might be analyzed
differently from other content-neutral restrictions.216
How, then, should we deal with speaker-based restrictions? As
with subject-matter restrictions, there are several possibilities.
First, for the sake of simplicity, we might treat all speaker-based
restrictions as either content-based or content-neutral. Second, we
might treat such restrictions as content-based if they correlate
"closely" with specific, identifiable viewpoints.1 7 Third, we might
213. Id. at 1572.
214. Id. The Court's ballot-access decisions usually have focused on the equal protection
clause. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers' Party, 440 U.S. 173
(1979); Lubin v. Parish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). For the Court's analysis of a related speaker-based
restriction, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93-104 (1976) (public financing of election
campaigns).
215. See 103 S. Ct. at 960-64.
216. See 103 S. Ct. at 957. Lower courts also have been puzzled by speaker-based restrictions. See, e.g., Henrico Professional Firefighters Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 649 F.2d 237
(4th Cir. 1981) (treating speaker-based restriction as triggering strict scrutiny under equal
protection clause); Greenburg v. Bolger, 497 F. Supp. 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (treating speakerbased restriction as content-based); Dayan v. Board of Regents, 491 F. Supp. 139 (M.D. Ga.
1979) (treating speaker-based restriction as content-neutral), afl'd, 620 F.2d 107 (5th Cir.
1980).
217. As a variation on this approach, we might treat speaker-based restrictions as content-based if the primary factor that defines speaker-identity is agreement on a particular
view. Under this approach, a distinction between political parties and the distinction in
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treat such restrictions as content-based if they are likely to distort
public debate substantially in a viewpoint-differential manner.
Fourth, we might treat such restrictions as content-neutral in some
contexts, such as subsidies and nonpublic fora, but as contentbased in other contexts, such as public fora. And fifth, we might
test such restrictions by an intermediate standard of review, The
critical point, however, is that to analyze these restrictions in a
principled manner, we must first understand the extent to which
they threaten core first amendment concerns.218
VI. CONCLUSION

Properly defined and understood, the content-based/contentneutral distinction makes sense. The distinction has powerful intuitive appeal and is consistent with core first amendment values.
Although criticism of the distinction is not wholly without merit, 219

it is not persuasive. An understanding of the first amendment that
fails to distinguish between content-neutral and viewpoint-based
restrictions would treat problems that are different as if they were
alike. It would meld existing first amendment standards into a single, unified approach. This would have a leveling effect. It would
unduly enhance the protection accorded to content-neutral restrictions, at the expense of competing governmental interests, and it
would dilute the protection accorded to viewpoint-based restrictions, at the expense of core first amendment values.
The distinction, however, is more subtle and complex than might
at first appear. The content-based and content-neutral concepts
are not self-defining. Taken literally, they do not comport precisely
with the concerns underlying the distinction. Moreover, several
types of ambiguous restrictions do not fit neatly within either the
content-based or the content-neutral category. Careful scrutiny of
these ambiguous restrictions reveals an almost bewildering array of
easily masked analytic refinements and distinctions. These ambiguous restrictions pose a central jurisprudential conflict between
Perry would be content-based, whereas laws like those in Taxation With Representation
and Schaumburg would be content-neutral.
218. For analysis of another form of ambiguous restriction, see Stone & Marshall, supra
note 114.
219. See Redish, supra note 3; Note, supra note 3.
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precision of analysis and clarity of doctrine.22 0 To what extent
should we tolerate miscategorization for the sake of clarity? To
what extent should we sacrifice clarity for the sake of analytic consistency? I have attempted in this Article, less to resolve this conflict, than to expose the puzzles and to bring the conflict to light.
Only by understanding the nature of the problems can we begin
thoughtfully to seek solutions.

220. For a thoughtful analysis of the conflict, see Schauer, supra note 13. For a discussion
of the conflict in the specific context of subject-matter restrictions, see Stone, supra note 24,
at 108-15.

